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Abstract
Consider the following problem: given a metric space, some of whose points are “clients,” select a set
of at most 푘 facility locations to minimize the average distance from the clients to their nearest facility.
This is just the well-studied 푘-median problem, for which many approximation algorithms and hardness
results are known. Note that the objective function encourages opening facilities in areas where there are
many clients, and given a solution, it is often possible to get a good idea of where the clients are located.
This raises the following quandary: what if the locations of the clients are sensitive information that we
would like to keep private? Is it even possible to design good algorithms for this problem that preserve
the privacy of the clients?
In this paper, we initiate a systematic study of algorithms for discrete optimization problems in the
framework of diﬀerential privacy (which formalizes the idea of protecting the privacy of individual input
elements). We show that many such problems indeed have good approximation algorithms that preserve
diﬀerential privacy; this is even in cases where it is impossible to preserve cryptographic deﬁnitions of
privacy while computing any non-trivial approximation to even the value of an optimal solution, let alone
the entire solution.
Apart from the 푘-median problem, we consider the problems of vertex and set cover, min-cut, k-
median, facility location, and Steiner tree, and give approximation algorithms and lower bounds for these
problems. We also consider the recently introduced submodular maximization problem, “Combinatorial
Public Projects” (CPP), shown by Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] to be inapproximable to subpolynomial
multiplicative factors by any eﬃcient and truthful algorithm. We give a diﬀerentially private (and hence
approximately truthful) algorithm that achieves a logarithmic additive approximation.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following problems:
∙ Assign people using a social network to one of two servers so that most pairs of friends are assigned to
the same server.
∙ Open some number of HIV treatment centers so that the average commute time for patients is small.
∙ Open a small number of drop-oﬀ centers for undercover agents so that each agent is able to visit some
site convenient to her (each providing a list of acceptable sites).
The above problems can be modeled as instances of well-known combinatorial optimization problems:
respectively the minimum cut problem, the 푘-median problem, and the set cover problem. Good heuristics
have been designed for these problems, and hence they may be considered well-studied and solved. However,
in the above scenarios and in many others, the input data (friendship relations, medical history, agents’
locations) represent sensitive information about individuals. Data privacy is a crucial design goal, and it
may be vastly preferable to use a private algorithm that gives somewhat suboptimal solutions to a non-
private optimal algorithm. This leads us to the following central questions: Given that the most benign of
actions possibly leaks sensitive information, how should we design algorithms for the above problems? What
are the fundamental trade-oﬀs between the utility of these algorithms and the privacy guarantees they give
us?
The notion of privacy we consider in this paper is that of diﬀerential privacy. Informally, diﬀerential
privacy guarantees that the distribution of outcomes of the computation does not change signiﬁcantly when
one individual changes her input data. This is a very strong privacy guarantee: anything signiﬁcant about
any individual that an adversary could learn from the algorithm’s output, he could also learn were the
individual not participating in the database at all—and this holds true no matter what auxiliary information
the adversary may have. This deﬁnition guarantees privacy of an individual’s sensitive data, while allowing
the computation to respond when a large number of individuals change their data, as any useful computation
must do.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper we initiate a systematic study of designing algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems
under the constraint of diﬀerential privacy. Here is a short summary of some of the main contributions of
our work.
∙ While the exponential mechanism of [MT07] is an easy way to obtain computationally ineﬃcient private
approximation algorithms for some problems, the approximation guarantees given by a direct applica-
tion of this can be far from optimal (e.g., see our results on min-cut and weighted set cover). In these
cases, we have to use diﬀerent techniques—often more sophisticated applications of the exponential
mechanism—to get good (albeit computationally expensive) solutions.
∙ However, we want our algorithms to be computationally eﬃcient and private at the same time: here
we cannot use the exponential mechanism directly, and hence we develop new algorithmic ideas. We
give private algorithms for a wide variety of search problems, where we must not only approximate the
value of the solution, but also produce a solution that optimizes this value. See Table 1 for our results.
∙ For some problems, unfortunately, just outputting an explicit solution might leak private information.
For example, if we output a vertex cover of some graph explicitly, any pair of vertices not output
reveals that they do not share an edge —so any private explicit vertex cover algorithm must output
푛 − 1 vertices. To overcome this hurdle, we instead privately output an implicit representation of a
small vertex cover— we view vertex cover as a location problem, and output an orientation of the
edges. Each edge can cover itself using the end point that it points to. The orientation is output
privately, and the resulting vertex cover approximates the optimal vertex cover well. We deal with
similar representational issues for other problems like set cover as well.
∙ We also show lower bounds on the approximation guarantees regardless of computational considera-
tions. For example, for vertex cover, we show that any 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm must have
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Non-private Eﬃcient Algorithms Information Theoretic
Vertex Cover 2× OPT [Pit85] (2 + 16/휖)× OPT Θ(1/휖)× OPT
Wtd. Vertex Cover 2× OPT [Hoc82] (16 + 16/휖)× OPT Θ(1/휖)× OPT
Set Cover ln푛× OPT [Joh74] 푂(ln푛+ ln푚/휖)× OPT † Θ(ln푚/휖)× OPT
Wtd. Set Cover ln푛× OPT [Chv79] 푂(ln푛(ln푚+ ln ln푛)/휖)× OPT † Θ(ln푚/휖)× OPT
Min Cut OPT [FF56] OPT +푂(ln푛/휖) † OPT + Θ(ln푛/휖)
CPPP (1− 1/푒)× OPT [NWF78] (1− 1/푒)× OPT−푂(푘 ln푚/휖) † OPT−Θ(푘 ln(푚/푘)/휖)
푘-Median (3 + 훾)× OPT [AGK+04] 6× OPT +푂(푘2 ln2 푛/휖) OPT + Θ(푘 ln(푛/푘)/휖)a
Table 1: Summary of Results. Results in the second and third columns are from this paper.
a[FFKN09] independently prove a similar lower bound.
an approximation guarantee of Ω(1/휖). We show that each of our lower bounds are tight: we give
(computationally ineﬃcient) algorithms with matching approximation guarantees.
∙ Our results have implications beyond privacy as well: Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] introduce the
Combinatorial Public Project problem, a special case of submodular maximization, and show that the
problem can be well approximated by either a truthful mechanism or an eﬃcient algorithm, but not by
both simultaneously. In contrast to this negative result, we show that under diﬀerential privacy (which
can be interpreted as an approximate but robust alternative to truthfulness) we can achieve the same
approximation factor as the best non-truthful algorithm, plus an additive logarithmic loss.
∙ Finally, we develop a private ampliﬁcation lemma: we show how to take private algorithms that gives
bounds in expectation and eﬃciently convert them (privately) into bounds with high probability. This
answers an open question in the paper of Feldman et al. [FFKN09].
Table 1 summarizes the bounds we prove in this paper. For each problem, it reports (in the ﬁrst
column) the best known non-private approximation guarantees, (in the second column) our best eﬃcient
휖-diﬀerentially private algorithms, and in each (in the third column) case matching upper and lower bounds
for ineﬃcient 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithms. For a few of the eﬃcient algorithms (marked with a †) the
guarantees are only for an approximate form of diﬀerential privacy, incorporating a failure probability 훿, and
scaling the eﬀective value of 휖 up by ln(1/훿).
1.2 Related Work
Diﬀerential privacy is a relatively recent privacy deﬁnition (e.g., see [DMNS06, Dwo06, NRS07, BLR08,
KLN+08, FFKN09, DNR+09], and see [Dwo08] for an excellent survey), that tries to capture the intuition of
individual privacy. Many algorithms in this framework have focused on measurement, statistics, and learning
tasks applied to statistical data sets, rather than on processing and producing combinatorial objects. One
exception to this is the Exponential Mechanism of [MT07] which allows the selection from a set of discrete
alternatives.
Independently, Feldman et al. [FFKN09] also consider the problem of privately approximating 푘-medians
for points in ℜ푑. Their model diﬀers slightly from ours, which makes the results largely incomparable: while
our results for general metrics translated to ℜ푑 give smaller additive errors than theirs, we only output a
푘-median approximation whereas they output coresets for the problem. Their lower bound argument for
private coresets is similar to ours.
Prior work on Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) tells us that in fact the minimum cut in a graph can be
computed in a distributed fashion in such a way that computations reveals nothing that cannot be learnt from
the output of the computation. While this is a strong form of a privacy guarantee, it may be unsatisfying to
an individual whose private data can be inferred from the privately computed output. Indeed, it is not hard
to come up with instances where an attacker with some limited auxiliary information can infer the presence
or absence of speciﬁc edges from local information about the minimum cut in the graph. By relaxing the
whole input privacy requirement of SFE, diﬀerential privacy is able to provide unconditional per element
privacy, which SFE need not provide if the output itself discloses properties of input.
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Feigenbaum et al. [FIM+06] extend the notion of SFE to NP hard problems for which eﬃcient algorithms
must output an approximation to the optimum, unless P=NP. They deﬁned as functional privacy the con-
straint that two inputs with the same output value (e.g. the size of an optimal vertex cover) must produce
the same value under the approximation algorithm. Under this constraint, Halevi et al. [HKKN01] show
that approximating the value of vertex cover to within 푛1−휉 is as hard as computing the value itself, for any
constant 휉. These hardness results were extended to search problems by Beimel et al. [BCNW06], where the
constraint is relaxed to only equate those inputs whose sets of optimal solutions are identical. These results
were extended and strengthened by Beimel et al. [BHN07, BMNW07].
Nonetheless, Feigenbaum et al. [FIM+06] and others show a number of positive approximation results
under versions of the functional privacy model. Halevi et al. [HKKN01] provide positive results in the
function privacy setting when the algorithm is permitted to leak few bits (each equivalence class of input
need not produce identical output, but must be one of at most 2푏 possible outcomes). Indyk and Woodruﬀ
also give some positive results for the approximation of ℓ2 distance and a nearest neighbor problem [IW06].
However, as functional privacy extends SFE, it does not protect sensitive data that can be inferred from the
output.
Nevertheless, SFE provides an implementation of any function in a distributed setting such that nothing
other than the output of the function is revealed. One can therefore run a diﬀerentially private algorithm is
a distributed manner using SFE (see e.g. [DKM+06, BNO08]), in the absence of a trusted curator.
2 Deﬁnitions
Diﬀerential privacy is a privacy deﬁnition for computations run against sensitive input data sets. Its require-
ment, informally, is that the computation behaves nearly identically on two input data sets that are nearly
identical; the probability of any outcome must not increase by more than a small constant factor when the
input set is altered by a single element. Formally,
Deﬁnition 1 ([DMNS06]). We say a randomized computation 푀 has 휖-diﬀerential privacy if for any two
input sets 퐴 and 퐵 with symmetric diﬀerence one, and for any set of outcomes 푆 ⊆ 푅푎푛푔푒(푀),
Pr[푀(퐴) ∈ 푆] ≤ exp(휖)×Pr[푀(퐵) ∈ 푆] . (2.1)
The deﬁnition has several appealing properties from a privacy perspective. One that is most important
for us is that arbitrary sequences of diﬀerentially private computations are also diﬀerentially private, with
an 휖 parameter equal to the sum of those comprising the sequence. This is true even when subsequent com-
putations can depend on and incorporate the results of prior diﬀerentially private computations [DKM+06],
allowing repetition of diﬀerentially private steps to improve solutions.
2.1 Approximate Diﬀerential Privacy
One relaxation of diﬀerential privacy [DKM+06] allows a small additive term in the bound:
Deﬁnition 2. We say a randomized computation 푀 has 훿-approximate 휖-diﬀerential privacy if for any two
input sets 퐴 and 퐵 with symmetric diﬀerence one, and for any set of outcomes 푆 ⊆ 푅푎푛푔푒(푀),
Pr[푀(퐴) ∈ 푆] ≤ exp(휖)×Pr[푀(퐵) ∈ 푆] + 훿 . (2.2)
The ﬂavor of guarantee is that although not all events have their probabilities preserved, the alteration
is only for very low probability events, and is very unlikely to happen. The 훿 is best thought of as 1/푝표푙푦(푛)
for a data set containing some subset of 푛 candidate records. We note that there are stronger notions
of approximate diﬀerential privacy (c.f. [MKA+08]), but in our settings, they are equivalent upto 푝표푙푦(푛)
changes in 훿. We therefore restrict ourselves to this deﬁnition here.
2.2 The Exponential Mechanism
One particularly general tool that we will often use is the exponential mechanism of [MT07]. This construc-
tion allows diﬀerentially private computation over arbitrary domains and ranges, parametrized by a query
function 푞(퐴, 푟) mapping a pair of input data set 퐴 (a multiset over some domain) and candidate result 푟 to
a real valued “score”. With 푞 and a target privacy value 휖, the mechanism selects an output with exponential
bias in favor of high scoring outputs:
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푃푟[ℰ휖푞(퐴) = 푟] ∝ exp(휖푞(퐴, 푟)) . (2.3)
If the query function 푞 has the property that any two adjacent data sets have score within Δ of each other,
for all possible outputs 푟, the mechanism provides 2휖Δ-diﬀerential privacy. Typically, we would normalize 푞
so that Δ = 1. We will be using this mechanism almost exclusively over discrete ranges, where we can derive
the following simple analogue of a theorem of [MT07], that the probability of a highly suboptimal output is
exponentially low:
Theorem 2.1. The exponential mechanism, when used to select an output 푟 ∈ 푅 gives 2휖Δ-diﬀerential
privacy, letting 푅OPT be the subset of 푅 achieving 푞(퐴, 푟) = max푟 푞(퐴, 푟), ensures that
Pr[푞(퐴, ℰ휖푞(퐴)) < max
푟
푞(퐴, 푟)− ln(∣푅∣/∣푅OPT∣)/휖− 푡/휖] ≤ exp(−푡) . (2.4)
The proof of the theorem is almost immediate: any outcome with score less than max푟 푞(퐴, 푟) −
ln(∣푅∣/∣푅OPT∣)/휖 − 푡/휖 will have normalized probability at most exp(−푡)/∣푅∣; each has weight at most
exp(OPT − 푡)∣푅OPT∣/∣푅∣, but is normalized by at least ∣푅OPT∣ exp(OPT) from the optimal outputs. As
there are at most ∣푅∣ such outputs their cumulative probability is at most exp(−푡).
3 Private Min-Cut
Given a graph 퐺 = (푉,퐸) the minimum cut problem is to ﬁnd a cut (푆, 푆푐) so as to minimize 퐸(푆, 푆푐).
In absence of privacy constraints, this problem is eﬃciently solvable exactly. However, outputting an exact
solution violates privacy, as we show in Section 3.1. Thus, we give an algorithm to output a cut within
additive 푂(log 푛/휖) edges of optimal.
The algorithm has two stages: First, given a graph 퐺, we add edges to the graph to raise the cost
of the min cut to at least 4 ln푛/휖, in a diﬀerentially private manner. Second, we deploy the exponential
mechanism over all cuts in the graph, using a theorem of Karger to show that for graphs with min cut
at least 4 ln푛/휖 the number of cuts within additive 푡 of OPT increases no faster than exponentially with
푡. Although the exponential mechanism takes time exponential in 푛, we can construct a polynomial time
version by considering only the polynomially many cuts within 푂(ln푛/휖) of OPT. Below, let 퐶표푠푡(퐻, (푆, 푆푐))
denote the size 퐸퐻(푆, 푆
푐) of the cut (푆, 푆푐) in a graph 퐻.
Algorithm 1 The Min-Cut Algorithm
1: Input: 퐺 = (푉,퐸),휖.
2: Let 퐻0 ⊂ 퐻1, . . . ,⊂ 퐻(푛2) be arbitrary strictly increasing sets of edges on 푉 .
3: Choose index 푖 ∈ [0, (푛2)] with probability proportional to exp(−휖∣OPT(퐺 ∪퐻푖)− 8 ln푛/휖∣).
4: Choose a subset 푆 ∈ 2푉 ∖ {∅, 푉 } with probability proportional to exp(−휖퐶표푠푡(퐺 ∪퐻푖, (푆, 푆푐))).
5: Output the cut 퐶 = (푆, 푆푐).
Our result relies on a result of Karger about the number of near-minimum cuts in a graph [Kar93]
Lemma 3.1 ([Kar93]). For any graph 퐺 with min cut 퐶, there are at most 푛2훼 cuts of size at most 훼퐶.
By enlarging the size of the min cut in 퐺 ∪퐻푖 to at least 4 ln푛/휖, we ensure that the number of cuts of
value OPT(퐺 ∪퐻푖) + 푡 is bounded by 푛2 exp(휖푡/2). The downweighting of the exponential mechanism will
be able to counteract this growth in number and ensure that we select a good cut.
Theorem 3.2. For any graph 퐺, the expected cost of ALG is at most OPT +푂(ln푛/휖).
Proof. First, we argue that the selected index 푖 satisﬁes 4 ln푛/휖 < OPT(퐺∪퐻푖) < OPT(퐺) + 12 ln푛/휖 with
probability at least 1−1/푛2. For OPT > 8 ln푛/휖, Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability of exceeding the
optimal choice (퐻0) by 4 ln푛/휖 is at most 1− 1/푛2. Likewise, for OPT < 8 ln푛/휖, there is some optimal 퐻푖
achieving min cut size 8 ln푛/휖, and the probability we end up farther away than 4 ln푛/휖 is at most 1− 1/푛2.
Assuming now that OPT(퐺∪퐻푖) > 4 ln푛/휖, Karger’s lemma argues that the number 푐푡 of cuts in 퐺∪퐻푖
of cost at most OPT(퐺∪퐻푖) + 푡 is at most 푛2 exp(휖푡/2). As we are assured a cut of size OPT(퐺∪퐻푖) exists,
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each cut of size OPT(퐺 ∪퐻푖) + 푡 will receive probability at most exp(−휖푡). Put together, the probability of
a cut exceeding OPT(퐺 ∪퐻푖) + 푏 is at most
Pr[퐶표푠푡(퐺 ∪퐻푖, 퐶) > OPT(퐺 ∪퐻푖) + 푏] ≤
∑
푡>푏
exp(−휖푡)(푐푡 − 푐푡−1) (3.5)
≤ (exp(휖)− 1)
∑
푡>푏
exp(−휖푡)푐푡 (3.6)
≤ (exp(휖)− 1)
∑
푡>푏
exp(−휖푡/2)푛2 (3.7)
The sum telescopes to exp(−휖푏/2)푛2/(exp(휖/2)− 1), and the denominator is within a constant factor of the
leading factor of (exp(휖)− 1), for 휖 < 1. For 푏 = 8 ln푛/휖, this probability becomes at most 1/푛2.
Theorem 3.3. The algorithm above preserves 2휖-diﬀerential privacy.
Note that the ﬁrst instance of the exponential mechanism in our algorithm runs eﬃciently (since it
is selecting from only
(
푛
2
)
objects), but the second instance does not. We now describe how to achieve
(휀, 훿)-diﬀerential privacy eﬃciently.
First recall that using Karger’s algorithm we can eﬃciently (with high probability) generate all cuts of
size at most 푘OPT for any constant 푘. Indeed it is shown in [Kar93] that in a single run of his algorithm,
any such cut is output with probability at least 푛−2푘 so that 푛2푘+1 runs of the algorithm will output all such
cuts except with an exponentially small probability.
Our eﬃcient algorithm works as follows: in step 4 of Algorithm 1, instead of sampling amongst all possible
cuts, we restrict attention to the set of cuts generated in 푛7 runs of Karger’s algorithm. We claim that the
output distribution of this algorithm has statistical distance 푂(1/푛2) from that of Algorithm 1, which would
imply that we get (휀,푂( 1푛2 ))-diﬀerential privacy.
Consider a hypothetical algorithm that generates the cut (푆, 푆푐) as in Algorithm 1 but then outputs
FAIL whenever this cut is not in the set of cuts generated by 푛7 runs of Karger’s. We ﬁrst show that the
probability that this algorithm outputs FAIL is 푂( 1푛2 ). As shown above, OPT(퐺 ∪퐻푖) is at least 4 ln푛/휀
except with probability 1푛2 . Conditioned on this, the cut chosen in Step 4 has cost at most 3OPT(퐺 ∪퐻푖)
except with probability 1푛2 . Since each such cut is in the sample except with exponentially small probability,
the claim follows. Finally, note that this hypothetical algorithm can be naturally coupled with both the
algorithms so that the outputs agree whenever the former doesn’t output FAIL. This implies the claimed
bound on the statistical distance. We remark that we have not attempted to optimize the running time here;
both the running time and the value of 훿 can be improved by choosing a larger constant (instead of 8) in
Step 3, at the cost of increasing the additive error by an additional constant.
3.1 Lower Bounds
We next show that this additive error is unavoidable for any diﬀerentially private algorithm. The lower
bound is information-theoretic and thus applies also to computationally ineﬃcient algorithms.
Theorem 3.4. Any 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm for min-cut must incur an expected additive Ω(ln푛/휖)
cost over OPT, for any 휖 ∈ (3 ln푛/푛, 112 ).
Proof. Consider a ln푛/3휖-regular graph 퐺 = (푉,퐸) on 푛 vertices such that the minimum cuts are exactly
those that isolate a single vertex, and any other cut has size at least (ln푛/2휖) (a simple probabilistic argument
establishes the existence of such a 퐺; in fact a randomly chosen ln푛/3휖-regular graph has this property with
high probability).
Let 푀 be an 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm for the min-cut. Given the graph 퐺, 푀 outputs a partition
of 푉 . Since there are 푛 = ∣푉 ∣ singleton cuts, there exists a vertex 푣 such that the mechanism 푀 run on 퐺
outputs the cut ({푣}, 푉 ∖ {푣}) with probability at most 1/푛, i.e.
푃푟[푀(푉,퐸) = ({푣}, 푉 ∖ {푣}) ≤ 1
푛
.
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Now consider the graph 퐺′ = (푉,퐸′), with the edges incident on 푣 removed from 퐺, i.e. 퐸′ = 퐸 ∖ {푒 :
푣 ∈ 푒}. Since 푀 satisﬁes 휖-diﬀerential privacy and 퐸 and 퐸′ diﬀer in at most ln푛/3휖 edges,
푃푟[푀(푉,퐸′) = ({푣}, 푉 ∖ {푣})] ≤ 1/푛1/3.
Thus with probability (1 − 1
푛
1
3
), 푀(퐺′) outputs a cut other than the minimum cut ({푣}, 푉 ∖ {푣}). But
all other cuts, even with these edges removed, cost at least (ln푛/6휖). Since OPTis zero for 퐺′, the claim
follows.
4 Private 푘-Median
We next consider a private version of the metric 푘-median problem: There is a pre-speciﬁed set of points
푉 and a metric on them, 푑 : 푉 × 푉 → ℝ. There is a (private) set of demand points 퐷 ⊆ 푉 . We wish
to select a set of medians 퐹 ⊂ 푉 with ∣퐹 ∣ = 푘 to minimize the quantity cost(퐹 ) = ∑푣∈퐷 푑(푣, 퐹 ) where
푑(푣, 퐹 ) = min푓∈퐹 푑(푣, 푓). Let Δ = max푢,푣∈푉 푑(푢, 푣) be the diameter of the space.
As we show in Section 4.1, any privacy-preserving algorithm for 푘-median must incur an additive loss of
Ω(Δ ⋅ 푘 ln(푛/푘)/휖), regardless of computational constraints. We observe that running the exponential mech-
anism to choose one of the
(
푛
푘
)
subsets of medians gives an (computationally ineﬃcient) additive guarantee.
Theorem 4.1. Using the exponential mechanism to pick a set of 푘 facilities gives an 푂(
(
푛
푘
)
푝표푙푦(푛))-time
휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm that outputs a solution with expected cost OPT +푂(푘Δ log 푛/휖).
We next give a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a slightly worse approximation guarantee. Our
algorithm is based on the local search algorithm of Arya et al. [AGK+04]. We start with an arbitrary set of
푘 medians, and use the exponential mechanism to look for a (usually) improving swap. After running this
local search for a suitable number of steps, we select a good solution from amongst the ones seen during the
local search. The following result shows that if the current solution is far from optimal, then one can ﬁnd
improving swaps.
Theorem 4.2 (Arya et al. [AGK+04]). For any set 퐹 ⊆ 푉 with ∣퐹 ∣ = 푘, there exists a set of 푘 swaps
(푥1, 푦1), . . . , (푥푘, 푦푘) such that
∑푘
푖=1(cost(퐹 )− cost(퐹 − {푥푖}+ {푦푖})) ≥ cost(퐹 )− 5OPT.
Corollary 4.3. For any set 퐹 ⊆ 푉 with ∣퐹 ∣ = 푘, there exists some swap (푥, 푦) such that
cost(퐹 )− cost(퐹 − {푥푖}+ {푦푖}) ≥ cost(퐹 )− 5OPT
푘
.
Algorithm 2 The 푘-Median Algorithm
1: Input: 푉 , Demand points 퐷 ⊆ 푉 , 푘,휖.
2: let 퐹1 ⊂ 푉 arbitrarily with ∣퐹1∣ = 푘, 휖′ ← 휖/(2Δ(푇 + 1)).
3: for 푖 = 1 to 푇 do
4: Select (푥, 푦) ∈ 퐹푖 × (푉 ∖ 퐹푖) with probability proportional to exp(−휖′ × cost(퐹푖 − {푥}+ {푦})).
5: let 퐹푖+1 ← 퐹푖 − {푥}+ {푦}.
6: end for
7: Select 푗 from {1, 2, . . . , 푇} with probability proportional to exp(−휖′ × cost(퐹푗)).
8: output 퐹푗 .
Theorem 4.4. Setting 푇 = 6푘 ln푛 and 휖′ = 휖/(2Δ(푇 + 1)), the 푘-median algorithm provides 휖-diﬀerential
privacy and except with probability 푂(1/poly(푛)) outputs a solution of cost at most 6OPT+푂(Δ푘2 log2 푛/휖).
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the privacy. Since the cost function has sensitivity Δ, Step 4 of the algorithm preserves
2휖′Δ diﬀerential privacy. Since Step 4 is run at most 푇 times and privacy composes additively, outputting
all of the 푇 candidate solutions would give us (2휖′Δ푇 ) diﬀerential privacy. Picking out a good solution from
the 푇 candidates costs us another 2휖′Δ, leading to the stated privacy guarantee.
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We next show the approximation guarantee. By Corollary 4.3, so long as cost(퐹푖) ≥ 6OPT, there exists a
swap (푥, 푦) that reduces the cost by at least cost(퐹푖)/6푘. As there are only 푛
2 possible swaps, the exponential
mechanism ensures through (2.4) that we are within additive 4 ln푛/휖′ with probability at least 1 − 1/푛2.
When cost(퐹푖) ≥ 6OPT + 24푘 ln푛/휖′, with probability 1− 1/푛2 we have cost(퐹푖+1) ≤ (1− 1/6푘)× cost(퐹푖).
This multiplicative decrease by (1 − 1/6푘) applies for as long as cost(퐹푖) ≥ 6OPT + 24푘 ln푛/휖′. Since
cost(퐹0) ≤ 푛Δ, and 푛Δ(1 − 1/6푘)푇 ≤ Δ ≤ 24푘 ln푛/휖′, there must exist an 푖 < 푇 such that cost(퐹푖) ≤
6OPT + 24푘 ln푛/휖′, with probability at least (1− 푇/푛2).
Finally, by applying the exponential mechanism again in the ﬁnal stage, we select from the 퐹푖 scoring
within an additive 4 ln푛/휖′ of the optimal visited 퐹푖 with probability at least 1 − 1/푛2, again by (2.4).
Plugging in the value of 휖′, we get the desired result. Increasing the constants in the additive term can drive
the probability of failure to an arbitrarily small polynomial.
4.1 푘-Median Lower Bound
Theorem 4.5. Any 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm for the 푘-median problem must incur cost OPT+Ω(Δ ⋅
푘 ln(푛/푘)/휖) on some inputs.
Proof. Consider a point set 푉 = [푛] × [퐿] of 푛퐿 points, with 퐿 = ln(푛/푘)/10휖, and a distance function
푑((푖, 푗), (푖′, 푗′)) = Δ whenever 푖 ∕= 푖′ and 푑((푖, 푗), (푖, 푗′)) = 0. Let 푀 be a diﬀerentially private algorithm
that takes a subset 퐷 ⊆ 푉 and outputs a set of 푘 locations, for some 푘 < 푛4 . Given the nature of the metric
space, we assume that 푀 outputs a 푘-subset of [푛]. For a set 퐴 ⊆ [푛], let 퐷퐴 = 퐴× [퐿]. Let 퐴 be a size-푘
subset of 푉 chosen at random.
We claim that that 피퐴,푀 [∣푀(퐷퐴) ∩ 퐴∣] ≤ 푘2 for any 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm 푀 . Before we
prove this claim, note that it implies the expected cost of 푀(퐷퐴) is
푘
2 ×Δ퐿, which proves the claim since
OPT = 0.
Now to prove the claim: deﬁne 휙 := 1푘피퐴,푀 [∣퐴 ∩푀(퐷퐴)∣]. We can rewrite
푘 ⋅ 휙 = 피퐴,푀 [∣퐴 ∩푀(퐷퐴)∣] = 푘 ⋅ 피푖∈[푛]피퐴∖{푖},푀 [1푖∈푀(퐷퐴)]
Now changing 퐴 to 퐴′ := 퐴∖{푖}+{푖′} for some random 푖′ requires altering at most 2퐿 elements in 퐷퐴′ , which
by the diﬀerential privacy guarantee should change the probability of the output by at most 푒2휖퐿 = (푛/푘)1/5.
Hence
피푖∈[푛]피퐴′,푀 [1푖∈푀(퐷퐴′ )] ≥ 휙 ⋅ (푘/푛)1/5.
But the expression on the left is just 푘/푛, since there at at most 푘 medians. Hence 휙 ≤ (푘/푛)4/5 ≤ 1/2,
which proves the claim.
Corollary 4.6. Any 1-diﬀerentially private algorithm for uniform facility location that outputs the set of
chosen facilities must have approximation ratio Ω(
√
푛).
Proof. We consider instances deﬁned on the uniform metric on 푛 points, with 푑(푢, 푣) = 1 for all 푢, 푣, and
facility opening cost 푓 = 1√
푛
. Consider a 1-diﬀerentially private mechanism 푀 when run on a randomly
chosen subset 퐴 of size 푘 =
√
푛. Since OPT is 푘푓 = 1 for these instances, any 표(
√
푛)-approximation must
select at least 푘2 locations from 퐴 in expectation. By an argument analogous to the above theorem, it follows
that any diﬀerentially private 푀 must output 푛/20 of the locations in expectation. This leads to a facility
opening cost of Ω(
√
푛).
4.2 Euclidean Setting
Feldman et al. [FFKN09] study private coresets for the 푘-median problem when the input points are in
ℜ푑. For 푃 points in the unit ball in ℜ푑, they give coresets with (1 + 휀) multiplicative error, and additive
errors about 푂(푘2푑2 log2 푃 ) and 푂(16푘푑)2푑푑3/2 log푃 log 푑푘) respectively for their ineﬃcient and eﬃcient
algorithms. Since Euclidean 푘-median has a PTAS, this leads to 푘-median approximations with the same
guarantees. We can translate our results to their setting by looking at a (1/푃 )-net of the unit ball as the
candidate set of 푛-points, of which some may appear. This would lead to an ineﬃcient algorithm with
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additive error 푂(푘푑 log푃 ), and an eﬃcient algorithm with additive error 푂(푘2푑2 log2 푃 ). The latter has a
multiplicative error of 6 and hence our eﬃcient algorithms are incomparable. Note that coresets are more
general objects than just the 푘-median solution.
5 Vertex Cover
We now turn to the problem of (unweighted) vertex cover, where we want to pick a set 푆 of vertices of
minimal size so that every edge in the graph is incident to at least one vertex in 푆. In the privacy-preserving
version of the problem, the private information we wish to conceal is the presence of absence of each edge.
Approximating the Vertex Cover Size. As mentioned earlier, even approximating the vertex cover size was
shown to be polynomially inapproximable under the constraint of functional privacy [HKKN01, BCNW06].
On the other hand, it is easy to approximate the size of the optimal vertex cover under diﬀerential privacy:
twice the size of a maximum matching is a 2-approximation to the optimal vertex cover, and this value only
changes by at most two with the presence or absence of a single edge. Hence, this value plus Laplace(2/휖)
noise provides 휖-diﬀerential privacy [DMNS06]. (Here it is important that we use maximum rather than just
maximal matchings, since the size of the latter is not uniquely determined by the graph, and the presence or
absence of an edge may dramatically alter the size of the solution.) Interestingly enough, for weighted vertex
cover with maximum weight 푤max (which we study in Section 5.2), we have to add in Lap(푤max/휖) noise
to privately estimate the weight of the optimal solution, which can be much larger than OPT itself. The
mechanism in Section 5.2 avoids this barrier by outputting an implicit representation of the vertex cover,
and hence gives us a 푂(1/휖) multiplicative approximation with 휖-diﬀerential privacy.
The Vertex Cover Search Problem. If we want to ﬁnd a vertex cover (and not just estimate its size), how can
we do this privately? In covering problems, the (private) data imposes hard constraints on the a solution,
making them quite diﬀerent from, say, min-cut. Indeed, while the private data only inﬂuences the objective
function in the min-cut problem, the data determines the constraints deﬁning feasible solutions in the case
of the vertex cover problem. This hard covering constraint make it impossible to actually output a small
vertex cover privately: as noted in the introduction, any diﬀerentially private algorithm for vertex cover that
outputs an explicit vertex cover (a subset of the 푛 vertices) must output a cover of size at least 푛− 1 with
probability 1 on any input, an essentially useless result.
In order to address this challenge, we require our algorithms to output an implicit representation of a
cover: we privately output an orientation of the edges. Now for each edge, if we pick the endpoint that it
points to, we clearly get a vertex cover. Our analysis ensures that this vertex cover has size not much larger
than the size of the optimal vertex cover for the instance. Hence, such an orientation may be viewed as a
privacy-preserving set of instructions that allows for the construction of a good vertex cover in a distributed
manner: in the case of the undercover agents mentioned in the introduction, the complete set of active
dropoﬀ sites (nodes) is not revealed to the agents, but an orientation on the edges tells each agent which
dropoﬀ site to use, if she is indeed an active agent. Our algorithms in fact output a permutation of all
the vertices of the graph. Each edge can be considered oriented towards the endpoint appearing earlier in
the permutation. Our lower bounds apply to the more general setting where we are allowed to output any
orientation (and hence are stronger).
5.1 The Algorithm for Unweighted Vertex Cover
Our (randomized) algorithm will output a permutation, and the vertex cover will be deﬁned by picking, for
each edge, whichever of its endpoints appears ﬁrst in the permutation. We show that this vertex cover will
be (2 + 푂(1/휖))-approximate and 휖-diﬀerentially private. Our algorithm is based on a simple (non-private)
2-approximation to vertex cover [Pit85] that repeatedly selects an uncovered edge uniformly at random, and
includes a random endpoint of the edge. We can view the process, equivalently, as selecting a vertex at
random with probability proportional to its uncovered degree. We will take this formulation and mix in a
uniform distribution over the vertices, using a weight that will grow as the number of remaining vertices
decreases.
Let us start from 퐺1 = 퐺, and let 퐺푖 be the graph with 푛 − 푖 + 1 vertices remaining. We will write
푑푣(퐺) for the degree of vertex 푣 in graph 퐺. The algorithm 퐴퐿퐺 in step 푖 chooses from the 푛 − 푖 + 1
vertices of 퐺푖 with probability proportional to 푑푣(퐺푖) + 푤푖, for an appropriate sequence ⟨푤푖⟩. Taking
9
푤푖 = (4/휖) × (푛/(푛 − 푖 + 1))1/2 provides 휖-diﬀerential privacy and a (2 + 16/휖) approximation factor, the
proof of which will follow from the forthcoming Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2.
As stated the algorithm outputs a sequence of vertices, one per iteration. As remarked above, this
permutation deﬁnes a vertex cover by picking the earlier occurring end point of each edge.
Algorithm 3 Unweighted Vertex Cover
1: let 푛← ∣푉 ∣, 푉1 ← 푉,퐸1 ← 퐸.
2: for 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , 푛 do
3: let 푤푖 ← (4/휖)×
√
푛/(푛− 푖+ 1).
4: pick a vertex 푣 ∈ 푉푖 with probability proportional to 푑퐸푖(푣) + 푤푖.
5: output 푣. let 푉푖+1 ← 푉푖 ∖ {푣}, 퐸푖+1 ← 퐸푖 ∖ ({푣} × 푉푖).
6: end for
Theorem 5.1 (Privacy). ALG satisﬁes 휖-diﬀerential privacy for the settings of 푤푖 above.
Proof. For any two sets of edges 퐴 and 퐵, and any permutation 휋, let 푑푖 be the degree of the 푖
푡ℎ vertex in
the permutation 휋 and let 푚푖 be the remaining edges, both ignoring edges incident to the ﬁrst 푖− 1 vertices
in 휋.
Pr[퐴퐿퐺(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[퐴퐿퐺(퐵) = 휋]
=
푛∏
푖=1
(푤푖 + 푑푖(퐴))/((푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 2푚푖(퐴))
(푤푖 + 푑푖(퐵))/((푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 2푚푖(퐵)) .
When 퐴 and 퐵 diﬀer in exactly one edge, 푑푖(퐴) = 푑푖(퐵) for all 푖 except the ﬁrst endpoint incident to the edge
in the diﬀerence. Until this term 푚푖(퐴) and 푚푖(퐵) diﬀer by exactly one, and after this term 푚푖(퐴) = 푚푖(퐵).
The number of nodes is always equal, of course. Letting 푗 be the index in 휋 of the ﬁrst endpoint of the edge
in diﬀerence, we can cancel all terms after 푗 and rewrite
Pr[퐴퐿퐺(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[퐴퐿퐺(퐵) = 휋]
=
푤푗 + 푑푗(퐴)
푤푗 + 푑푗(퐵)
×
∏
푖≤푗
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 2푚푖(퐵)
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 2푚푖(퐴) .
An edge may have arrived in 퐴, in which case 푚푖(퐴) = 푚푖(퐵)+1 for all 푖 ≤ 푗, and each term in the product
is at most one; moreover, 푑푗(퐴) = 푑푗(퐵) + 1, and hence the leading term is at most 1 + 1/푤푗 < exp(1/푤1),
which is bounded by exp(휖/2).
Alternately, an edge may have departed from 퐴, in which case the lead term is no more than one, but
each term in the product exceeds one and their product must now be bounded. Note that 푚푖(퐴)+1 = 푚푖(퐵)
for all relevant 푖, and that by ignoring all other edges we only make the product larger. Simplifying, and
using 1 + 푥 ≤ exp(푥), we see
∏
푖≤푗
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 2푚푖(퐵)
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 2푚푖(퐴) ≤
∏
푖≤푗
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 2
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 + 0 =
∏
푖≤푗
(
1 +
2
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖
)
≤ exp
⎛⎝∑
푖≤푗
2
(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖
⎞⎠ .
The 푤푖 are chosen so that
∑
푖 2/(푛− 푖+ 1)푤푖 = (휀/
√
푛)
∑
푖 1/2
√
푖 is at most 휀.
Theorem 5.2 (Accuracy). For all 퐺, 피[퐴퐿퐺(퐺)] ≤ (2 + 2 avg푖≤푛 푤푖)×∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ ≤ (2 + 16/휖)∣OPT(퐺)∣.
Proof. Let 푂푃푇 (퐺) denote an arbitrary optimal solution to the vertex cover problem on 퐺. The proof is
inductive, on the size 푛 of 퐺. For 퐺 with ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ > 푛/2, the theorem holds. For 퐺 with ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ ≤ 푛/2,
the expected cost of the algorithm is the probability that the chosen vertex 푣 is incident to an edge, plus the
expected cost of 퐴퐿퐺(퐺 ∖ 푣).
피[퐴퐿퐺(퐺)] = Pr[푣 incident on edge] + 피푣[피[퐴퐿퐺(퐺 ∖ 푣)]] .
We will bound the second term using the inductive hypothesis. To bound the ﬁrst term, the probability that
푣 is chosen incident to an edge is at most (2푚푤푛+2푚)/(푛푤푛+2푚), as there are at most 2푚 vertices incident
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to edges. On the other hand, the probability that we pick a vertex in 푂푃푇 (퐺) is at least (∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣푤푛 +
푚)/(푛푤푛 + 2푚). Since ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ is non-negative, we conclude that
Pr[푣 incident on edge] ≤ (2 + 2푤푛)(푚/(푛푤푛 + 2푚)) ≤ (2 + 2푤푛)Pr[푣 ∈ 푂푃푇 (퐺)]
Since 1[푣 ∈ 푂푃푇 (퐺)] ≤ ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ − ∣푂푃푇 (퐺 ∖ 푣)∣, and using the inductive hypothesis, we get
피[퐴퐿퐺(퐺)] ≤ (2 + 2푤푛)× (∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ − 피푣[∣푂푃푇 (퐺 ∖ 푣)∣]) + (2 + 2 avg
푖<푛
푤푖)× 피푣[∣푂푃푇 (퐺 ∖ 푣)∣]
= (2 + 2푤푛)× ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣+ (2 avg
푖<푛
푤푖 − 2푤푛)× 피푣[∣푂푃푇 (퐺 ∖ 푣)∣]
The probability that 푣 is from an optimal vertex cover is at least (∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣푤푖+푚)/(푛푤푖+2푚), as mentioned
above, and (using (푎+ 푏)/(푐+ 푑) ≥ min{푎/푐, 푏/푑}) is at least min{∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣/푛, 1/2} = ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣/푛, since
∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ < 푛/2 by assumption. Thus 피[∣푂푃푇 (퐺 ∖ 푣)∣] is bounded above by (1− 1/푛)× ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣, giving
피[퐴퐿퐺(퐺)] ≤ (2 + 2푤푛)× ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣+ (2 avg
푖<푛
푤푖 − 2푤푛)× (1− 1/푛)× ∣푂푃푇 (퐺)∣ .
Simpliﬁcation yields the claimed results, and instantiating 푤푖 completes the proof.
Hallucinated Edges. Here is a slightly diﬀerent way to implement the intuition behind the above algo-
rithm: imagine adding 푂(1/휖) “hallucinated” edges to each vertex (the other endpoints of these hallucinated
edges being fresh “hallucinated” vertices), and then sampling vertices without replacement proportional to
these altered degrees. However, once (say) 푛/2 vertices have been sampled, output the remaining vertices
in random order. This view will be useful to keep in mind for the weighted vertex cover proof. (A formal
analysis of this algorithm is in Appendix A.)
5.2 Weighted Vertex Cover
In the weighted vertex cover problem, each vertex 푉 is assigned a weight 푤(푣), and the cost of any vertex
cover is the sum of the weights of the participating vertices. One can extend the unweighted 2-approximation
that draws vertices at random with probability proportional to their uncovered degree to a weighted 2-
approximation by drawing vertices with probability proportional to their uncovered degree divided by their
weight. The diﬀerentially private analog of this algorithm essentially draws vertices with probability pro-
portional to 1/휖 plus their degree, all divided by the weight of the vertex; the algorithm we present here is
based on this idea.
Deﬁne the score of a vertex to be 푠(푣) = 1/푤(푣). Our algorithm involves hallucinating edges: to
each vertex, we add in 1/휖 hallucinated edges, the other endpoints of which are imaginary vertices, whose
weight is considered to be ∞ (and hence has zero score). The score of an edge 푒 = (푢, 푣) is deﬁned to be
푠(푒) = 푠(푢) + 푠(푣); hence the score of a fake edge 푓 incident on 푢 is 푠(푓) = 푠(푢), since its other (imaginary)
endpoint has inﬁnite weight and zero score. We will draw edges with probability proportional to their
score, and then select an endpoint to output with probability proportional to its score. In addition, once a
substantial number of vertices of at least a particular weight have been output, we will output the rest of
those vertices.
Assume the minimum vertex weight is 1 and the maximum is 2퐽 . For simplicity, we round the weight
of each vertex up to a power of 2, at a potential loss of a factor of two in the approximation. Deﬁne the
푗푡ℎ weight class 푉푗 to be the set of vertices of weight 2
푗 . In addition, we will assume that ∣푉푗 ∣ = ∣푉푗+1∣ for
all weight classes. In order to achieve this, we hallucinate additional fake vertices. We will never actually
output a hallucinated vertex. Let 푁푗 denote ∣푉푗 ∣.
We imagine the 푖푡ℎ iteration of the outer loop of the algorithm as happening at time 푖; note that one
vertex is output in Step 3, whereas multiple vertices might be output in Step 6. Let 푛˜푖 be the sum of the
scores of all real vertices not output before time 푖, and 푚˜푖 be the sum of the scores of all real edges not
covered before time 푖.
5.2.1 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 5.3. The weighted vertex cover algorithm preserves 푂(휖) diﬀerential privacy.
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Algorithm 4 Weighted Vertex Cover
1: while not all vertices have been output do
2: pick an uncovered (real or hallucinated) edge 푒 = (푢, 푣) with probability proportional to 푠(푒).
3: output endpoint 푢 ∈ 푒 with probability proportional to 푠(푢).
4: while there exists some weight class 푉푗 such that the number of nodes of class 푗 or higher that we’ve
output is at least 푁푗/2 = ∣푉푗 ∣/2 do
5: pick the smallest such value of 푗
6: output (“dump”) all remaining vertices in 푉푗 in random order.
7: end while
8: end while
Proof. Consider some potential output 휋 of the private vertex cover algorithm, and two weighted vertex
cover instances 퐴 and 퐵 that are identical except for one edge e = (푝, 푞). Let 푝 appear before 푞 in the
permutation 휋; since the vertex sets are the same, if the outputs of both 퐴 and 퐵 are 휋, then 푝 will be
output at the same time 푡 in both executions. Let 푣푡 be the vertex output in Step 3 at time 푡 in such an
execution; note that either 푝 = 푣푡, or 푝 is output in Step 6 after 푣푡 is output.
The probability that (conditioned on the history) a surviving vertex 푣 is output in Step 3 of the algorithm
at time 푖 is: ∑
edges 푒 Pr[pick 푒] ⋅Pr[output 푣 ∣ pick 푒] =
∑
푒∋푣
푠(푒)
푚˜푖+푛˜푖/휖
⋅ 푠(푣)푠(푒) = (푑(푣)+1/휖)⋅푠(푣)푚˜푖+푛˜푖/휖 .
Since we compare the runs of the algorithm on 퐴 and 퐵 which diﬀer only in edge e, these will be identical
after time 푡 when e is covered, and hence
Pr[푀(퐴)=휋]
Pr[푀(퐵)=휋] =
(푑퐴(푣푡)+1/휖)푠(푣푡)
(푑퐵(푣푡)+1/휖)푠(푣푡)
∏
푖≤푡
(
푚˜퐵푖 +푛˜푖/휖
푚˜퐴푖 +푛˜푖/휖
)
.
Note that if the extra edge e ∈ 퐴 ∖ 퐵 then 푑퐴(푣푡) ≤ 푑퐵(푣푡) + 1 and 푚˜퐵푖 ≤ 푚˜퐴푖 , so the ratio of the
probabilities is at most 1 + 휖 < exp(휖). Otherwise, the leading term is less than 1 and 푚˜퐵푖 = 푚˜
퐴
푖 + 푠(e), and
we get
Pr[푀(퐴)=휋]
Pr[푀(퐵)=휋] ≤
∏
푖≤푡
(
1 + 푠(e)푛˜푖/휖
)
≤ exp
(
푠(e) ⋅ 휖 ⋅∑푖≤푡 1푛˜푖) .
Let 푇푗 be the time steps 푖 ≤ 푡 where vertices in 푉푗 are output in 휋. Letting 2푗∗ be the weight of the
lighter endpoint of edge e, we can break the sum
∑
푖≤푡
1
푛˜푖
into two pieces and analyze each separately:∑
푖≤푡
1
푛˜푖
=
∑
푗≤푗∗
∑
푖∈푇푗
1
푛˜푖
+
∑
푗>푗∗
∑
푖∈푇푗
1
푛˜푖
,
For the ﬁrst partial sum, for some 푗 ≤ 푗∗, let∑푖∈푇푗 1푛˜푖 = 1푛˜푖0 + 1푛˜푖1 +. . .+ 1푛˜푖휆 such that 푖0 > 푖1 > . . . > 푖휆.
We claim that 푛˜푖0 ≥ 2−푗
∗
푁푗∗/2. Indeed, since e has not yet been covered, we must have output fewer than
푁푗∗/2 vertices from levels 푗
∗ or higher, and hence at least 푁푗∗/2 remaining vertices from 푉푗∗ contribute to
푛˜푖0 .
In each time step in 푇푗 , at least one vertex of score 2
−푗 is output, so we have that 푛˜푖ℓ ≥ 2−푗
∗
푁푗∗/2+ℓ⋅2−푗 .
Hence ∑
푖∈푇푗
1
푛˜푖
≤ 1
2−푗∗푁푗∗/2
+ 1
2−푗∗푁푗∗/2+2−푗
+ . . .+ 1
2−푗∗푁푗∗/2+푁푗 2−푗
.
Deﬁning 휃 = 2−푗
∗+푗 ⋅푁푗∗/2, the expression above simpliﬁes to
2푗
(
1
휃 +
1
휃+1 + . . .+
1
휃+푁푗
)
≤ 2푗 ln
(
휃+푁푗
휃
)
= 2푗 ln
(
1 +
푁푗
휃
)
.
Now using the assumption on the size of the weight classes, we have 푁푗 ≤ 푁푗∗ =⇒ 푁푗/휃 ≤ 2푗∗−푗+1, and
hence
∑
푖∈푇푗
1
푛˜푖
≤ (푗∗ − 푗 + 2)2푗 , for any 푗 ≤ 푗∗. Finally,∑
푗≤푗∗
∑
푖∈푇푗
1
푛˜푖
≤∑푗≤푗∗(푗∗ − 푗 + 2)2푗 = 푂(2푗∗).
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We now consider the other partial sum
∑
푗>푗∗
∑
푖∈푇푗
1
푛˜푖
. For any such value of 푖, we know that 푛˜푖 ≥
2−푗
∗
푁푗∗/2. Moreover, there are at most 푁푗∗/2 times when we output a vertex from some weight class
푗 ≥ 푗∗ before we output all of 푉푗∗ ; hence there are at most 푁푗∗/2 terms in the sum, each of which is at most
1
2−푗∗ 푁푗∗/2
, giving a bound of 2푗
∗
on the second partial sum. Putting the two together, we get that
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
≤ exp(푠(e) ⋅ 휖 ⋅푂(2푗∗)) = exp(푂(휖)),
using the fact that 푠(e) ≤ 2 ⋅ 2−푗∗ , since the lighter endpoint of e had weight 2푗∗ .
5.2.2 Utility Analysis
Call a vertex 푣 interesting if it is incident on a real uncovered edge when it is picked. Consider the weight
class 푉푗 : let 퐼
1
푗 ⊆ 푉푗 be the set of interesting vertices output due to Steps 3, and 퐼2푗 ⊆ 푉푗 be the set of
interesting vertices of class 푗 output due to Step 6. The cost incurred by the algorithm is
∑
푗 2
푗(∣퐼1푗 ∣+ ∣퐼2푗 ∣).
Lemma 5.4. 피[
∑
푗 2
푗 ∣퐼1푗 ∣] ≤ 4(1+휀)휀 OPT
Proof. Every interesting vertex that our algorithm picks in Steps 3 has at least one real edge incident on
it, and at most 1휀 hallucinated edges. Conditioned on selecting an interesting vertex 푣, the selection is due
to a real edge with probability at least 1/(1 + 1휀 ). One can show that the (non-private) algorithm 풜 that
selects only real edges is a 2-approximation [Pit85]. On the other hand each vertex in 퐼1푗 can be coupled to
a step of 풜 with probability 휀/(1 + 휀). Since we rounded up the costs by at most a factor of two, the claim
follows.
Lemma 5.5. 피[∣퐼2푗 ∣] ≤ 6피[
∑
푗′≥푗 ∣퐼1푗′ ∣]
Proof. Let 푡푗 denote the time that class 푗 is dumped. Recall that by (5.2.1), we pick a surviving vertex 푣
with probability ∝ (푑(푣) + 1휀 ) ⋅ 푠(푣) at each step. This expression summed over all uninteresting vertices is
∪푗′≥푗푉푗′ is at most (1/휀)
∑
푗′≥푗 2
−푗′푁푗′ ≤ 2−푗+1푁푗/휀. On the other hand, at each step before time 푡푗 , all
the interesting vertices in 퐼2푗 are available and the same expression summed over them is at least 2
−푗 ∣퐼2푗 ∣/휖.
Thus for any 푡 ≤ 푡푗 , conditioned on outputting a vertex 푣푡 ∈ ∪푗′≥푗푉푗′ in Step 3, the probability that it
is interesting is at least
∣퐼2푗 ∣2−푗/휀
(∣퐼2푗 ∣2−푗+21−푗푁푗)/휀 ≥
∣퐼2푗 ∣
3푁푗
(using ∣퐼2푗 ∣ ≤ 푁푗). Now since we output 푁푗/2 vertices
from ∪푗′≥푗푉푗′ in Step 3 before time 푡푗 , we conclude that 피
[∑
푗′≥푗 ∣퐼1푗′ ∣
∣∣ ∣퐼2푗 ∣ ] ≥ 푁푗2 × ∣퐼2푗 ∣3푁푗 = ∣퐼2푗 ∣6 . Taking
expectations completes the proof.
We can now compute the total cost of all the interesting vertices dumped in Steps 6 of the algorithm.
피[cost(
∪
푗 퐼
2
푗 )] =
∑
푗 2
푗 피[∣퐼2푗 ∣] ≤ 6
∑
푗 2
푗
∑
푗′≥푗 피[∣퐼1푗′ ∣] ≤ 6
∑
푗′ 피[∣퐼1푗′ ∣] 2푗
′+1 ≤ 12 ⋅ 피[cost(∪푗 퐼1푗 )].
Finally, combining this calculation with Lemma 5.4, we conclude that our algorithm gives an 푂( 1휀 ) approxi-
mation to the weighted vertex cover problem.
5.3 Vertex Cover Lower Bounds
Theorem 5.6. Any algorithm for the vertex cover problem that prescribes edge-orientations with 휖-diﬀerential
privacy must have an Ω(1/휖) approximation guarantee, for any 휖 ∈ ( 1푛 , 1].
Proof. Let 푉 = {1, 2, . . . , ⌈ 12휖⌉}, and let 푀 be an 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm that takes as input a
private set 퐸 of edges, and outputs an orientation 푀퐸 : 푉 × 푉 → 푉 , with 푀퐸(푢, 푣) ∈ {푢, 푣} indicating
to the edge which endpoint to use. Picking two distinct vertices 푢 ∕= 푣 uniformly at random (and equating
(푢, 푣) with (푣, 푢)), we have by symmetry:
Pr푢,푣[푀∅((푢, 푣)) ∕= 푢] = 12 .
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Let ★푢 = (푉, {푢} × (푉 ∖ {푢})) be the star graph rooted at 푢. Since ★푢 and ∅ diﬀer in at most 12휖 − 1 < 1휖
edges and 푀 satisﬁes 휖-diﬀerential privacy, we conclude that
Pr푢,푣[푀★푢((푢, 푣)) ∕= 푢] ≥ 12푒 .
Thus the expected cost of 푀 when input a uniformly random ★푢 is at least
1
2푒 × ⌈ 12휖⌉, while OPT(★푢) is 1.
We can repeat this pattern arbitrarily, picking a random star from each group of 1/휖 vertices; this results in
graphs with arbitrarily large vertex covers where 푀 incurs cost 1/휖 times the cost.
6 Set Cover
We now turn our attention to private approximations for the Set Cover Problem; here the set system (푈,풮)
is public, but the actual set of elements to be covered 푅 ⊆ 푈 is the private information. As for vertex cover,
we cannot explicitly output a set cover that is good and private at the same time. Hence, we again output a
permutation over all the sets in the set system; this implicitly deﬁnes a set cover for 푅 by picking, for each
element 푅, the ﬁrst set in this permutation that contains it. Our algorithms for set cover give the slightly
weaker (휖, 훿)-privacy guarantees.
6.1 Unweighted Set Cover
We are given a set system (푈,풮) and must cover a private subset 푅 ⊂ 푈 . Let the cardinality of the set
system be ∣풮∣ = 푚, and let ∣푈 ∣ = 푛. We ﬁrst observe a computationally ineﬃcient algorithm.
Theorem 6.1. The exponential mechanism, when used to pick a permutation of sets, runs in time 푂(푚!푝표푙푦(푛))
and gives an 푂(log(푒푚/OPT)/휖)-approximation.
Proof. A random permutation, with probability at least
(
푚
OPT
)−1
has all the sets in OPT before any set in
OPT푐. Thus the additive error is 푂(log
(
푚
OPT
)
/휖).
The rest of the section gives a computationally eﬃcient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees: this is
a modiﬁed version of the greedy algorithm, using the exponential mechanism to bias towards picking large
sets.
Algorithm 5 Unweighted Set Cover
1: Input: Set system (푈,풮), private 푅 ⊂ 푈 of elements to cover, 휖,훿.
2: let 푖← 1, 푅푖 = 푅, 풮푖 ← 풮. 휖′ ← 휖/2 ln( 푒훿 ).
3: for 푖 = 1, 2, . . . ,푚 do
4: pick a set 푆 from 풮푖 with probability proportional to exp(휖′∣푆 ∩푅푖∣).
5: output set 푆.
6: 푅푖+1 ← 푅푖 ∖ 푆, 풮푖+1 ← 풮푖 − {푆}.
7: end for
6.1.1 Utility Analysis
At the beginning of iteration 푖, say there are 푚푖 = 푚−푖+1 remaining sets and 푛푖 = ∣푅푖∣ remaining elements,
and deﬁne 퐿푖 = max푆∈풮 ∣푆 ∩ 푅푖∣, the largest number of uncovered elements covered by any set in 풮. By a
standard argument, any algorithm that always picks sets of size 퐿푖/2 is an 푂(ln푛) approximation algorithm.
Theorem 6.2. The above algorithm achieves an expected approximation ratio of 푂(ln푛+ ln푚휖′ ) = 푂(ln푛+
ln푚 ln(푒/훿)
휖 ).
Proof. As there is at least one set containing 퐿푖 elements, our use of the exponential mechanism to select sets
combined with Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability we select a set covering fewer than 퐿푖 − 3 ln푚/휖
elements is at most 1/푚2. While 퐿푖 > 6 ln푚/휖, with probability at least (1−1/푚) we always select sets that
cover at least 퐿푖/2 elements, and can therefore use no more than 푂(OPT ln푛) sets. Once 퐿푖 drops below
this bound, we observe that the number of remaining elements ∣푅푖∣ is at most OPT ⋅ 퐿푖. Any permutation
therefore costs at most an additional 푂(OPT ln푚/휖′).
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6.1.2 Privacy
Theorem 6.3. The unweighted set cover algorithm preserves (휖, 훿) diﬀerential privacy for any 휖 ∈ (0, 1),
and 훿 < 1/푒.
Proof. Let 퐴 and 퐵 be two set cover instances that diﬀer in some element 퐼. Say that 푆퐼 is the collection
of sets containing 퐼. Fix an output permutation 휋, and write 푠푖,푗(퐴) to denote the size of set 푆푗 after the
ﬁrst 푖− 1 sets in 휋 have been added to the cover.
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
=
푛∏
푖=1
(
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,휋푖(퐴))/(
∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴)))
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,휋푖(퐵))/(
∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐵)))
)
=
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푡,휋푡(퐴))
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푡,휋푡(퐵))
⋅
푡∏
푖=1
(∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐵))∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴))
)
where 푡 is such that 푆휋푡 is the ﬁrst set containing 퐼 to fall in the permutation 휋. After 푡, the remaining
elements in 퐴 and 퐵 are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the 푡푡ℎ term, the
numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If 퐴
contains 퐼 and 퐵 does not the ﬁrst term is exp(휖′) and the each term in the product is at most 1.
Now suppose that 퐵 contains 퐼 and 퐴 does not . In this case, the ﬁrst term is exp(−휖′) < 1. Moreover,
in instance 퐵, every set in 푆퐼 is larger by 1 than in 퐴, and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we
have:
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
≤
푡∏
푖=1
(
(exp(휖′)− 1) ⋅∑푗∈푆퐼 exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴)) +∑푗 exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴))∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴))
)
=
푡∏
푖=1
(1 + (exp(휖′)− 1) ⋅ 푝푖(퐴))
where 푝푖(퐴) is the probability that a set containing 퐼 is chosen at step 푖 of the algorithm running on instance
퐴, conditioned on picking the sets 푆휋1 , . . . , 푆휋푖−1 in the previous steps.
For an instance퐴 and an element 퐼 ∈ 퐴, we say that an output 휎 is 푞-bad if∑푖 푝푖(퐴)1(퐼 uncovered at step 푖)
(strictly) exceeds 푞, where 푝푖(퐴) is as deﬁned above. We call a permutation 푞-good otherwise. We ﬁrst con-
sider the case when the output 휋 is (ln 훿−1)-good. By the deﬁnition of 푡, we have
푡−1∑
푖=1
푝푖(퐴) ≤ ln 훿−1.
Continuing the analysis from above,
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
≤
푡∏
푖=1
exp((exp(휖′)− 1)푝푖(퐴)) ≤ exp(2휖′
푡∑
푖=1
푝푖(퐴))
≤ exp(2휖′(ln(1
훿
) + 푝푡(퐴))) ≤ exp(2휖′(ln(1
훿
) + 1)).
Thus, for any (ln 훿−1)-good output 휋, we have Pr[푀(퐴)=휋]Pr[푀(퐵)=휋] ≤ exp(휖). We can then invoke the following
lemma, proved in appendix B
Lemma 6.4. For any set system (푈,풮), any instance 퐴 and any 퐼 ∈ 퐴, the probability that the output 휋 of
the algorithm above is 푞-bad is bounded by exp(−푞).
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Thus for any set 풫 of outcomes, we have
Pr[푀(퐴) ∈ 풫] =
∑
휋∈풫
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
=
∑
휋∈풫:휋 is (ln 훿−1)-good
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋] +
∑
휋∈풫:휋 is (ln 훿−1)-bad
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
≤
∑
휋∈풫:휋 is (ln 훿−1)-good
exp(휖)Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋] + 훿
≤ exp(휖)Pr[푀(퐵) ∈ 풫] + 훿.
Corollary 6.5. For 휖 < 1 and 훿 = 1/poly(푛), there is an 푂( ln푛 ln푚휖 )-approximation algorithm for the
unweighted set cover problem preserving (휖, 훿)-diﬀerential privacy.
6.2 Weighted Set Cover
We are given a set system (푈,풮) and a cost function 퐶 : 풮 → ℝ. We must cover a private subset 푅 ⊂ 푈 .
W.l.o.g., let min푆∈풮 퐶(푆) = 1, and denote max푆∈풮 퐶(푆) = 푊 . Let the cardinality of the set system be
∣풮∣ = 푚, and let ∣푈 ∣ = 푛.
Algorithm 6 Weighted Set Cover
1: let 푖← 1, 푅푖 = 푅, 풮푖 ← 풮, 푟푖 ← 푛, 휖′ = 휖2 ln(푒/훿) , 푇 = Θ
( log푚+log log(푛푊 )
휖′
)
2: while 푟푖 ≥ 1/푊 do
3: pick a set 푆 from 풮푖 with probability proportional to exp
(
휖′
( ∣푆 ∩푅푖∣ − 푟푖 ⋅ 퐶(푆) ))
or halve with probability proportional to exp(−휖′푇 )
4: if halve then
5: let 푟푖+1 ← 푟푖/2, 푅푖+1 ← 푅푖, 풮푖+1 ← 풮푖, 푖← 푖+ 1
6: else
7: output set 푆
8: let 푅푖+1 ← 푅푖 ∖ 푆, 풮푖+1 ← 풮푖 − {푆}, 푟푖+1 ← 푟푖, 푖← 푖+ 1
9: end if
10: end while
11: output all remaining sets in 풮푖 in random order
Let us ﬁrst analyze the utility of the algorithm. If 푅 = ∅, the algorithm has cost zero and there is nothing
to prove. So we can assume that OPT ≥ 1. We ﬁrst show that (whp) 푟푖 ⪆ 푅푖/OPT.
Lemma 6.6. Except with probability 1/poly(푚), we have 푟푖 ≥ ∣푅푖∣2OPT for all iterations 푖.
Proof. Clearly 푟1 = 푛 ≥ ∣푅1∣/2OPT. For 푟푖 to fall below ∣푅푖∣/2, it must be in ( ∣푅푖∣2OPT , ∣푅푖∣OPT ] and be halved in
Step 6 of some iteration 푖. We’ll show that this is unlikely: if at some iteration 푖, ∣푅푖∣2OPT ≤ 푟푖 ≤ ∣푅푖∣OPT , then
we argue that with high probability, the algorithm will not output halve and thus not halve 푟푖. Since all
remaining elements 푅푖 can be covered at cost at most OPT, there must exist a set 푆 such that
∣푆∩푅푖∣
퐶(푆) ≥ ∣푅푖∣OPT ,
and hence ∣푆 ∩푅푖∣ ≥ 퐶(푆) ⋅ ∣푅푖∣OPT ≥ 퐶(푆) ⋅ 푟푖.
Hence 푢푖(푆) := ∣푆 ∩ 푅푖∣ − 푟푖 ⋅ 퐶(푆) ≥ 0 in this case, and the algorithm will output 푆 with probability
at least proportional to 1, whereas it outputs halve with probability proportional to exp(−휖′푇 ). Thus,
Pr[ algorithm returns halve ] < exp(−휖′푇 ) = 1/ poly(푚 log 푛푊 ). Since there are 푚 sets in total, and
푟 ranges from 푛 to 1/푊 , there are at most 푚 + 푂(log 푛푊 ) iterations, and the proof follows by a union
bound.
Let us deﬁne a score function 푢푖(푆) := ∣푆 ∩ 푅푖∣ − 푟푖 ⋅ 퐶(푆), and 푢푖(halve) := −푇 : note that in Step 4
of our algorithm, we output either halve or a set 푆, with probabilities proportional to exp(휖′푢푖(⋅)). The
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following lemma states that with high probability, none of the sets output by our algorithm have very low
scores (since we are much more likely to output halve than a low-scoring set).
Lemma 6.7. Except with probability at most 1/poly(푚), Step 4 only returns sets 푆 with 푢푖(푆) ≥ −2푇 .
Proof. There are at most ∣풮푖∣ ≤ 푚 sets 푆 with score 푢푖(푆) ≤ −2푇 , and so one is output with probability
at most proportional to 푚 exp(−2푇휖). We will denote this bad event by ℬ. On the other hand, halve is
output with probability proportional to exp(−푇휖). Hence, Pr[halve]/Pr[ℬ] ≥ exp(푇휖)/푚, and so Pr[ℬ] ≤
푚/ exp(푇휖) ≤ 1/ poly(푚 log 푛푊 ). Again there are at most 푚+푂(log 푛푊 ) iterations, and the lemma follows
by a trivial union bound.
We now analyze the cost incurred by the algorithm in each stage. Let us divide the algorithm’s execution
into stages: stage 푗 consists of all iterations 푖 where ∣푅푖∣ ∈ ( 푛2푗 , 푛2푗−1 ]. Call a set 푆 interesting if it is incident
on an uncovered element when it is picked. Let ℐ푗 be the set of interesting sets selected in stage 푗, and 퐶(ℐ푗)
be the total cost incurred on these sets.
Lemma 6.8. Consider stages 1, . . . , 푗 of the algorithm. Except with probability 1/ poly(푚), we can bound
the cost of the interesting sets in stage 1, . . . , 푗 by:∑
푗′≤푗
퐶(ℐ푗′) ≤ 4푗OPT ⋅ (1 + 2푇 ).
Proof. By Lemma 6.7 all the output sets have 푢푖(푆푖) ≥ −2푇 whp. Rewriting, each 푆푖 selected in a round
푗′ ≤ 푗 satisﬁes
퐶(푆푖) ≤ ∣푆푖 ∩푅푖∣+ 2푇
푟푖
≤ 2
푗′+1 OPT
푛
(∣푆푖 ∩푅푖∣+ 2푇 ),
where the second inequality is whp, and uses Lemma 6.6. Now summing over all rounds 푗′ ≤ 푗, we get
∑
푗′≤푗
퐶(ℐ푗′) ≤
∑
푗′≤푗
2푗
′+1 OPT
푛
( ∑
푖 s.t. 푆푖∈ℐ푗′
(∣푆푖 ∩푅푖∣+ 2푇 )).
Consider the inner sum for any particular value of 푗′: let the ﬁrst iteration in stage 푗′ be iteration 푖0—
naturally 푅푖 ⊆ 푅푖0 for any iteration 푖 in this stage. Now, since 푆푖 ∩ 푅푖 ⊆ 푅푖0 and 푆푖 ∩ 푅푖 is disjoint
from 푆푖′ ∩ 푅푖′ , the sum over ∣푆푖 ∩ 푅푖∣ is at most ∣푅푖0 ∣, which is at most 푛2푗′−1 by deﬁnition of stage 푗′.
Moreover, since we are only concerned with bounding the cost of interesting sets, each ∣푆푖 ∩푅푖∣ ≥ 1, and so
∣푆푖 ∩푅푖∣+ 2푇 ≤ ∣푆푖 ∩푅푖∣(1 + 2푇 ). Putting this together, (6.2) implies∑
푗′≤푗
퐶(ℐ푗′) ≤
∑
푗′≤푗
2푗
′+1 OPT
푛
× 푛
2푗′−1
(1 + 2푇 ) = 4푗 OPT (1 + 2푇 ),
which proves the lemma.
Theorem 6.9 (Utility). The weighted set cover algorithm incurs a cost of 푂(푇 log 푛OPT) except with
probability 1/ poly(푚).
Proof. Since the number of uncovered elements halves in each stage by deﬁnition, there are at most 1+ log 푛
stages, which by Lemma 6.8 incur a total cost of at most 푂(log 푛 OPT ⋅ (1 + 2푇 )). The sets that remain and
are output at the very end of the algorithm incur cost at most 푊 for each remaining uncovered element;
since 푟푖 < 1/푊 at the end, Lemma 6.6 implies that ∣푅푖∣ < 2OPT/푊 (whp), giving an additional cost of at
most 2OPT.
We can adapt the above argument to bound the expected cost by 푂(푇 log 푛 OPT).
Theorem 6.10 (Privacy). For any 훿 > 0, the weighted set cover algorithm preserves (휖, 훿) diﬀerential
privacy.
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Proof. We imagine that the algorithm outputs a set named “HALVE” when Step 4 of the algorithm returns
halve, and show that even this output is privacy preserving. Let 퐴 and 퐵 be two set cover instances that
diﬀer in some element 퐼. Say that 푆퐼 is the collection of sets containing 퐼. Fix an output 휋, and write
푢푖,푗(퐴) to denote the score of 휋푗 (recall this may be halve) after the ﬁrst 푖− 1 sets in 휋 have been selected.
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
=
푛∏
푖=1
(
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푢푖,휋푖(퐴))/(
∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푢푖,푗(퐴)))
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푢푖,휋푖(퐵))/(
∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푢푖,푗(퐵)))
)
=
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푢푡,휋푡(퐴))
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푢푡,휋푡(퐵))
⋅
푡∏
푖=1
(∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푢푖,푗(퐵))∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푢푖,푗(퐴))
)
where 푡 is such that 푆휋푡 is the ﬁrst set containing 퐼 to fall in the permutation 휋. After 푡, the remaining
elements in 퐴 and 퐵 are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the 푡푡ℎ term, the
numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If 퐴
contains 퐼 and 퐵 does not the ﬁrst term is exp(휖′) and the each term in the product is at most 1. Since
휖′ ≤ 휖, we conclude that in this case, for any set 풫 of outputs, Pr[푀(퐴) ∈ 풫] ≤ exp(휖)Pr[푀(퐵) ∈ 풫].
Now suppose that 퐵 contains 퐼 and 퐴 does not . In this case, the ﬁrst term is exp(−휖′) < 1. Moreover,
in instance 퐵, every set in 푆퐼 is larger by 1 than in 퐴, and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we
have:
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
≤
푡∏
푖=1
(
(exp(휖′)− 1) ⋅∑푗∈푆퐼 exp(휖′ ⋅ 푢푖,푗(퐴)) +∑푗 exp(휖′ ⋅ 푢푖,푗(퐴))∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푢푖,푗(퐴))
)
=
푡∏
푖=1
(
1 + (푒휖
′ − 1) ⋅ 푝푖(퐴)
)
where 푝푖(퐴) is the probability that a set containing 퐼 is chosen at step 푖 of the algorithm running on instance
퐴, conditioned on picking the sets 푆휋1 , . . . , 푆휋푖−1 in the previous steps.
For an instance퐴 and an element 퐼 ∈ 퐴, we say that an output 휎 is 푞-bad if∑푖 푝푖(퐴)1(퐼 uncovered at step 푖)
(strictly) exceeds 푞, where 푝푖(퐴) is as deﬁned above. We call a permutation 푞-good otherwise. We ﬁrst con-
sider the case when the output 휋 is (ln 훿−1)-good. By the deﬁnition of 푡, we have
푡−1∑
푖=1
푝푖(퐴) ≤ ln 훿−1.
Continuing the analysis from above,
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
≤
푡∏
푖=1
exp((exp(휖′)− 1)푝푖(퐴)) ≤ exp
(
2휖′
푡∑
푖=1
푝푖(퐴)
)
≤ exp (2휖′ (ln 훿−1 + 푝푡(퐴))) ≤ exp (2휖′ (ln 훿−1 + 1)) .
Thus, for any (ln 훿−1)-good output 휋, we have Pr[푀(퐴)=휋]Pr[푀(퐵)=휋] ≤ exp(휖).
Finally, as in the proof of Theorem 6.3, we can use lemma 6.4 to complete the proof.
6.3 Removing the Dependence on 푊
We can remove the dependence of the algorithm on 푊 with a simple idea. For an instance ℐ = (푈,풮), let
풮푗 = {푆 ∈ 풮 ∣ 퐶(푆) ∈ (푛푗 , 푛푗+1] }. Let 푈 푗 be the set of elements such that the cheapest set containing them
is in 풮푗 . Suppose that for each 푗 and each 푆 ∈ 풮푗 , we remove all elements that can be covered by a set of
cost at most 푛푗−1, and hence deﬁne 푆′ to be 푆 ∩ (푈 푗 ∪ 푈 푗−1). This would change the cost of the optimal
solution only by a factor of 2, since if we were earlier using 푆 in the optimal solution, we can pick 푆′ and at
most 푛 sets of cost at most 푛푗−1 to cover the elements covered by 푆 ∖ 푆′. Call this instance ℐ ′ = (푈,풮 ′).
Now we partition this instance into two instances ℐ1 and ℐ2, where ℐ1 = (∪푗 even푈 푗 ,풮 ′), and where
ℐ2 = (∪푗 odd푈 푗 ,풮 ′). Since we have just partitioned the universe, the optimal solution on both these instances
costs at most 2OPT(ℐ). But both these instances ℐ1, ℐ2 are themselves collections of disjoint instances, with
each of these instances having 푤max/푤min ≤ 푛2; this immediately allows us to remove the dependence on
푊 . Note that this transformation is based only on the set system (푈,풮), and not on the private subset 푅.
Theorem 6.11. For any 휖 ∈ (0, 1), 훿 = 1/ poly(푛), there is an 푂(푙표푔푛(log푚+ log log 푛)/휖)-approximation
for the weighted set cover problem that preserves (휖, 훿)-diﬀerential privacy.
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6.4 Lower bounds
Theorem 6.12. Any 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm that maps elements to sets must have approxi-
mation factor Ω(log푚/휖), for a set cover instance with 푚 sets and ((log푚)/휖)푂(1) elements, for any
휖 ∈ (2 log푚/푚 120 , 1).
Proof. We consider a set system with ∣푈 ∣ = 푁 and 풮 a uniformly random selection of 푚 size-푘 subsets of
푈 . We will consider problem instances 푆푖 consisting of one of these 푚 subsets, so OPT(푆푖) = 1. Let 푀 be
an 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm that on input 푇 ⊆ 푈 , outputs an assignment 푓 mapping each element
in 푈 to some set in 풮 that covers it. The number of possible assignments is at most 푚푁 . The cost on input
푇 under an assignment 푓 is the cardinality of the set 푓(푇 ) = ∪푒∈푇 푓(푒).
We say assignment 푓 is good for a subset 푇 ⊆ 푈 if its cost ∣푓(푇 )∣ is at most 푙 = 푘2 . We ﬁrst show that
any ﬁxed assignment 푓 : 푈 → [푚], such that ∣푓−1(푗)∣ ≤ 푘 for all 푗, is unlikely to be good for a randomly
picked size-푘 subset 푇 of 푈 . The number of ways to choose 푙 sets from among those with non-empty 푓−1(⋅)
is at most
(
푁
푙
)
. Thus the probability that 푓 is good for a random size-푘 subset is at most
(
푁
푙
) (
푙푘
푁
)푘
. Setting
푘 = 푁1/10, and 푙 = 푘2 , this is at most(
푁푒
푙
)푙(
푙푘
푁
)푘
=
(
푒푘3
2푁
)푘/2
≤ 2−푘 log푁/4.
Let 푚 = 22휖푘. The probability that 푓 is good for at least 푡 of our 푚 randomly picked sets is bounded by(
푚
푡
)(
2−푘 log푁/4
)푡
≤ 22휖푘푡2−푡푘 log푁/4 ≤ 2−푡푘 log 푘/8.
Thus, with probability at most 2−푁푘 log 푘/8, a ﬁxed assignment is good for more than 푁 of 푚 randomly
chosen size-푘 sets. Taking a union bound over 푚푁 = 22휖푘푁 possible assignments, the probability that any
feasible assignment 푓 is good for more than 푁 sets is at most 2−푁푘 log 푘/16. Thus there exists a selection of
size-푘 sets 푆1, . . . , 푆푚 such that no feasible assignment 푓 is good for more than 푁 of the 푆푖’s.
Let 푝푀(∅)(푆푖) be the probability that an assignment drawn from the distribution deﬁned by running 푀
on the the empty set as input is good for 푆푖. Since any ﬁxed assignment is good for at most 푁 of the 푚 sets,
the average value of 푝푀(∅) is at most 푁/푚. Thus there exists a set, say 푆1 such that 푝푀(∅)(푆1) ≤ 푁/푚. Since
∣푆푖∣ = 푘 and 푀 is 휖-diﬀerentially private, 푝푀(푆1)(푆1) ≤ 푒푥푝(휖푘)푝푀(∅)(푆1) < 12 . Thus with probability at
least half, the assignment 푀 picks on 푆1 is not good for 푆1. Since OPT(푆1) = 1, the expected approximation
ratio of 푀 is at least 푙/2 = log푚4휖 .
Additionally, one can take 푠 distinct instances of the above problem, leading to a new instance on 푠 ⋅푁
elements and 푠 ⋅푚 sets. OPT is now 푠, while it is easy to check that any private algorithm must cost Ω(푠 ⋅ 푙)
in expectation. Thus the lower bound in fact rules out additive approximations.
6.5 An Ineﬃcient Algorithm for Weighted Set Cover
For completeness, we now show that the lower bound shown above is tight even in the weighted case, in the
absence of computational constraints. Recall that we are given a collection 풮 of subsets of a universe 푈 ,
and a private subset 푅 ⊆ 푈 of elements to be covered. Additionally, we have weights on sets; we round up
weights to powers of 2, so that sets in 풮푗 have weight exactly 2−푗 . Without loss of generality, the largest
weight is 1 and the smallest weight is 푤 = 2−퐿.
As before, we will output a permutation 휋 on 풮, with the understanding that the cost 푐표푠푡(푅, 휋) of a
permutation 휋 on input 푅 is deﬁned to be the total cost of the set cover resulting from picking the ﬁrst set
in the permutation containing 푒, for each 푒 ∈ 푅.
Our algorithm constructs this permutation in a gradual manner. It maintains a permutation 휋푗 on ∪푖≤푗풮푖
and a threshold 푇푗 . In step 푗, given 휋푗−1 and 푇푗−1, the algorithm constructs a partial permutation 휋푗 on
∪푖≤푗풮푗 , and a threshold 푇푗 . In each step, we use the exponential mechanism to select an extension with an
appropriate base distribution 휇푗 and score function 푞. At the end of step 퐿, we get our permutation 휋 = 휋퐿
on 풮.
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Our permutations 휋푗 will all have a speciﬁc structure. The weight of the 푖th set in the permutation, as a
function of 푖 will be a unimodal function that is non-increasing until 푇푗 , and then non-decreasing. In other
words, 휋푗 contains sets from 풮푗 as a continuous block. The sets that appear before 푇푗 are said to be in the
bucket. We call a partial permutation respecting this structure good. We say a good permutation 휋 extends
a good partial permutation 휋푗 if 휋푗 and 휋 agree on their ordering on ∪푖≤푗풮푖.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the score function that is used in these choices. A natural objective function would be
푐표푠푡(푅, 휋푗) = min휋 extends 휋푗 푐표푠푡(푅, 휋), i.e. the cost of the optimal solution conditioned on respecting the
partial permutation 휋푗 . We use a slight modiﬁcation of this score function: we force the cover to contain
all sets from the bucket and denote as 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋) the resulting cover deﬁned by 푅 on 휋. We then deﬁne
푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋푗) naturally as min휋 extends 휋푗 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋). We ﬁrst record the following easy facts:
Observation 6.13. For any 푅, min휋 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋) = min휋 푐표푠푡(푅, 휋) = OPT. Moreover, for any 휋, 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋) ≥
푐표푠푡(푅, 휋).
To get (휋푗 , 푇푗) given (휋푗−1, 푇푗−1), we insert a permutation 휎푗 of 풮푗 after the ﬁrst 푇푗−1 elements of 휋푗−1,
and choose 푇푗 , where both 휎푗 and 푇푗 are chosen using the exponential mechanism. The base measure on 휎푗
is uniform and the base measure on 푇푗 − 푇푗−1 is the geometric distribution with parameter 1/푚2.
Let 푐˜표푠푡(퐴, (휎푗 , 푇푗)) be deﬁned as 푐˜표푠푡(퐴, 휋푗) − 푐˜표푠푡(퐴, 휋푗−1), where 휋푗 is constructed from 휋푗−1 and
(휎푗 , 푇푗) as above. The score function we use to pick (휎푗 , 푇푗) is 푠푐표푟푒푗(푅, (휎푗 , 푇푗)) = 2
푗 푐˜표푠푡(푅, (휎푗 , 푇푗)).
Thus 푃푟[(휎푗 , 푇푗)] ∝ (1/푚2(푇푗 − 푇푗−1)) exp(휀푠푐표푟푒((휎푗 , 푇푗))).
Let the optimal solution to the instance contain 푛푗 sets from 풮푗 . Thus OPT =
∑
푗 2
−푗푛푗 . We ﬁrst show
that 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋퐿) is 푂(OPT log푚/휀). By Observation 6.13, the approximation guarantee would follow.
The probability that the 푛푗 sets in OPT fall in the bucket when picking from the base measure is at least
1/푚3푛푗 . When that happens, 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋푗) = 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋푗−1). Thus the exponential mechanism ensures that
except with probability 1/푝표푙푦(푚):
푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋푗) ≤ 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋푗−1) + 4 ⋅ 2−푗 log(푚3푛푗 )/휖 = 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋푗−1) + 12 ⋅ 2−푗푛푗 log푚/휖
Thus with high probability,
푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋퐿) ≤ 푐˜표푠푡(푅, 휋0) + 12
∑
푗
2−푗푛푗 log푚/휖
= OPT + 12OPT log푚/휖
Finally, we analyze the privacy. Let 푒 ∈ 푈 be an element such that the cheapest set covering 푈 has
cost 2−푗푒 . Let 퐴 and 퐵 be two instances that diﬀer in element 푒. It is easy to see that ∣푐˜표푠푡(퐴, (휎푗 , 푇푗)) −
푐˜표푠푡(퐵, (휎푗 , 푇푗))∣ is bounded by 2−푗 for all 푗. We show something stronger:
Lemma 6.14. For any good partial permutation 휋푗 and any 퐴,퐵 such that 퐴 = 퐵 ∪ {푒},
∣푠푐표푟푒(퐴, (휎푗 , 푇푗))− 푠푐표푟푒푗(퐵, (휎푗 , 푇푗))∣ ≤
{
0 if 푗 > 푗푒
2푗푒−푗+1 if푗 ≤ 푗푒
Proof. Let 휋퐵 be the permutation realizing 푐˜표푠푡(퐵). For 푗 ≤ 푗푒, if 푒 is covered by a set in the bucket in 휋퐵 ,
then the cost of 휋퐵 is no larger in instance 퐴 and hence 푐˜표푠푡(퐴, 휋푗) = 푐˜표푠푡(퐵, 휋푗)
1. In the case that the
bucket in 휋퐵 does not cover 푒, then 푐˜표푠푡(퐴, 휋푗) ≤ 푐˜표푠푡(퐴, 휋퐵) = 푐˜표푠푡(퐵, 휋퐵) + 2−푗푒 = 푐˜표푠푡(퐵, 휋푗) + 2−푗푒 .
Since this also holds for 휋푗−1, this implies the claim from 푗 ≤ 푗푒.
For 푗 > 푗푒, observe that the ﬁrst set in 휋퐵 that covers 푒 is fully determined by the partial permutation
휋푗 , since the sets in ∪푖>푗푒풮푖 do not contain 푒. Thus 푐˜표푠푡(퐴, (휎푗 , 푇푗)) = 푐˜표푠푡(퐵, (휎푗 , 푇푗)) and the claim
follows.
1We remark that this is not true for the function 푐표푠푡, and is the reason we had to modify it to 푐˜표푠푡.
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Then for any 푗 ≤ 푗푒, lemma 6.14 implies that for any (휎푗 , 푇푗), exp(휖(푠푐표푟푒(퐴, (휎푗 , 푇푗))−푠푐표푟푒(퐵, (휎푗 , 푇푗)))) ∈
[exp(−휖2푗푒−푗+1), exp(휖2푗푒−푗+1)]. Thus
Pr[휎푗 , 푇푗 ∣퐴]
Pr[휎푗 , 푇푗 ∣퐵] ∈ [exp(−2
푗−푗푒+2휖), exp(2푗−푗푒+2휖)]
Moreover, for any 푗 > 푗푒, this ratio is 1. Thus
Pr[휎푗 , 푇푗 ∣퐴]
Pr[휎푗 , 푇푗 ∣퐵] ∈ [Π푗≤푗푒 exp(−2
푗−푗푒+2휖),Π푗≤푗푒 exp(2
푗−푗푒+2휖)]
⊆ [exp(−8휖), exp(8휖)],
which implies 8휖-diﬀerential privacy.
7 Facility Location
Consider the metric facility location problem: we are given a metric space (푉, 푑), a facility cost 푓 and a
(private) set of demand points 퐷 ⊆ 푉 . We want to select a set of facilities 퐹 ⊆ 푉 to minimize∑푣∈퐷 푑(푣, 퐹 )+
푓 ⋅ ∣퐹 ∣. (Note that we assume “uniform” facility costs here instead of diﬀerent costs 푓푖 for diﬀerent 푖 ∈ 푉 .)
Assume that distances are at least 1, and let Δ = max푢,푣 푑(푢, 푣) denote the diameter of the space.
We use the result of Fakcharoenphol et al. [FRT04] that any metric space on 푛 points can be approximated
by a distribution over dominating trees with expected stretch 푂(log 푛); moreover all the trees in the support
of the distribution are rooted 2-HSTs—they have 퐿 = 푂(log Δ) levels, with the leaves (at level 0) being
exactly = 푉 , the internal nodes being all Steiner nodes, the root having level 퐿, and all edges between
levels (푖 + 1) and 푖 having length 2푖. Given such a tree 푇 and node 푣 at level 푖, let 푇푣 denote the (vertices
in) the subtree rooted at 푣.
By Corollary 4.6, it is clear that we cannot output the actual set of facilities, so we will instead output
instructions in the form of an HST 푇 = (푉푇 , 퐸푇 ) and a set of facilities 퐹 ⊆ 푉푇 : each demand 푥 ∈ 퐷 then
gets assigned to its ancestor facility at the lowest level in the tree. (We guarantee that the root is always in
퐹 , hence this is well-deﬁned.) Now we are charged for the connection costs, and for the facilities that have
at least one demand assigned to them.
Algorithm 7 The Facility Location Algorithm
1: Input: Metric (푉, 푑), facility cost 푓 , demands 퐷 ⊆ 푉 ,휖.
2: Pick a random distance-preserving FRT tree 푇 ; recall this is a 2-HST with 퐿 = 푂(log Δ) levels.
3: let 퐹 ← root 푟.
4: for 푖 = 1 to 퐿 do
5: for all vertices 푣 at level 푖 do
6: let 푁푣 = ∣퐷 ∩ 푇푣∣ and 푁˜푣 = 푁푣 + Lap(퐿/휖).
7: if 푁˜푣 ⋅ 2푖 > 푓 then 퐹 ← 퐹 ∪ 푣.
8: end for
9: end for
10: output (푇, 퐹 ): each demand 푥 ∈ 퐷 is assigned to the ancestor facility at lowest level in 푇 .
Theorem 7.1. The above algorithm preserves 휖-diﬀerential privacy and outputs a solution of cost OPT ⋅
푂(log 푛 log Δ) ⋅ log Δ휖 log
(
푛 log2 Δ
휖
)
.
For the privacy analysis, instead of outputting the set 퐹 we could imagine outputting the tree 푇 and
all the counts 푁˜푣; this information clearly determines 퐹 . Note that the tree is completely oblivious of the
demand set. Since adding or removing any particular demand vertex can only change 퐿 counts, and the
noise added in Step 6 gives us 휀/퐿-diﬀerential privacy, the fact that diﬀerential privacy composes linearly
gives us the privacy claim.
For the utility analysis, consider the “noiseless” version of the algorithm which opens a facility at 푣 when
푁푣 ⋅ 2푖 ≥ 푓 . It can be shown that this ideal algorithm incurs cost at most 푓 + 푂(log 푛 log Δ) ⋅ OPT (see,
e.g., [Ind04, Theorem 3]). We now have two additional sources of error due to the noise:
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∙ Consider the case when 푁푣 ⋅ 2푖 ≥ 푓 > 푁˜푣 ⋅ 2푖, which increases the connection cost of some demands in
퐷. However, the noise is symmetric, and so we overshoot the mark with probability at most 1/2—and
when this happens the 2-HST property ensures that the connection cost for any demand 푥 increases
by at most a factor of 2. Since there are at most 퐿 = 푂(log Δ) levels, the expected connection cost
increases by at most a factor of 퐿.
∙ Consider the other case when 푁푣 ⋅ 2푖 < 푓 ≤ 푁˜푣 ⋅ 2푖, which increases the facility cost. Note that if
푁푣 ⋅ 2푖 ≥ 푓/2, then opening a facility at 푣 can be charged again in the same way as for the noiseless
algorithm (up to a factor of 2). Hence suppose that 푁˜푣−푁푣 ≥ 12 (푓/2푖), and hence we need to consider
the probability 푝푖 of the event that Lap(퐿/휖) >
1
2 (푓/2
푖), which is just 퐿휖 exp(− 푓2푖+1 휖퐿 ).
Note that if for some value of 푖, 푓 ≥ 퐿 2푖+1휖 log 퐿
2푛
휀 , the above probability 푝푖 is at most 1/퐿푛, and
hence the expected cost of opening up spurious facilities at nodes with such values of 푖 is at most
(1/퐿푛) ⋅ 퐿푛 ⋅ 푓 = 푓 . (There are 퐿 levels, and at most 푛 nodes at each level.)
For the values of 푖 which are higher; i.e., for which 푓 < 퐿 2
푖+1
휖 log
퐿2푛
휀 , we pay for this facility only if
there is a demand 푥 ∈ 퐷 in the subtree below 푣 that actually uses this facility. Hence this demand 푥
must have used a facility above 푣 in the noiseless solution, and we can charge the cost 푓 of opening
this facility to length of the edge 2푖+1 above 푣. Thus the total cost of spurious facilities we pay for is
the cost of the noiseless solution times a factor 퐿휖 log
퐿2푛
휀 .
Thus the expected cost of the solution is at most
OPT ⋅푂(log 푛 log Δ) ⋅ log Δ
휖
log
(
푛 log2 Δ
휖
)
. (7.8)
8 Combinatorial Public Projects (Submodular Maximization)
Recently Papadimitriou et al.[PSS08] introduced the Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPP Problem)
and showed that there is a succinctly representable version of the problem for which, although there exists
a constant factor approximation algorithm, no eﬃcient truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation
ratio better than 푚
1
2−휖, unless 푁푃 ⊆ 퐵푃푃 . Here we adapt our set cover algorithm to give a privacy
preserving approximation to the CPP problem within logarithmic (additive) factors.
In the CPP problem, we have 푛 agents and 푚 resources publicly known. Each agent submits a private
non-decreasing and submodular valuation function 푓푖 over subsets of resources, and our goal is to select a size-
푘 subset 푆 of the resources to maximize
∑푛
푖=1 푓푖(푆). We assume that we have oracle access to the functions
푓푖. Note that since each 푓푖 is submodular, so is
∑푛
푖=1 푓푖(푆), and our goal is to produce a algorithm for
submodular maximization that preserves the privacy of the individual agent valuation functions. Without loss
of generality, we will scale the valuation functions such that they take maximum value 1: max푖,푆 푓푖(푆) = 1.
Once again, we have an easy computationally ineﬃcient algorithm.
Theorem 8.1. The exponential mechanism when used to choose 푘 sets runs in time 푂(
(
푚
푘
)
푝표푙푦(푛)) and has
expected quality at least (1− 1/푒)푂푃푇 −푂(log (푚푘 )/휖).
We next give a computationally eﬃcient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees. We adapt our un-
weighted set cover algorithm, simply selecting 푘 items greedily:
Algorithm 8 CPP Problem
1: Input: A set of 푀 of 푚 resources, private functions 푓1, . . . , 푓푛, a number of resources 푘, 휖, 훿.
2: let 푀1 ←푀 , 퐹 (푥) :=
∑푚
푖=1 푓푖(푥), 푆1 ← ∅, 휖′ ← 휖푒 ln(푒/훿) .
3: for 푖 = 1 to 푘 do
4: pick a resource 푟 from 푀푖 with probability proportional to exp(휖
′(퐹 (푆푖 + {푟})− 퐹 (푆푖))).
5: let 푀푖+1 ←푀푖 − {푟}, 푆푖+1 ← 푆푖 + {푟}.
6: end for
7: Output 푆푘+1.
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8.1 Utility Analysis
Theorem 8.2. Except with probability 푂(1/poly(푛)), the algorithm for the CPP problem returns a solution
with quality at least (1− 1/푒)OPT−푂(푘 log푚/휖′).
Proof. Since 퐹 is submodular and there exists a set 푆∗ with ∣푆∣ = 푘 and 퐹 (푆) = OPT, there always exists
a resource 푟 such that 퐹 (푆푖 + {푟}) − 퐹 (푆푖) ≥ (OPT − 퐹 (푆푖))/푘. If we always selected the optimizing
resource, the distance to OPT would decrease by a factor of 1 − 1/푘 each round, and we would achieve
an approximation factor of 1 − 1/푒. Instead, we use the exponential mechanism which, by (2.4), selects a
resource within 4 ln푚/휖′ of the optimizing resource with probability at least 1− 1/푚3. With probability at
least 1 − 푘/푚3 each of the 푘 selections decreases OPT − 퐹 (푆푖) by a factor of (1 − 1/푘), while increasing it
by at most an additive 4 ln푚/휖′, giving (1− 1/푒)OPT +푂(푘 ln푚/휖′).
8.2 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 8.3. For any 훿 ≤ 1/2, the CPP problem algorithm preserves (휖′(푒 − 1) ln(푒/훿), 훿)-diﬀerential
privacy.
Proof. Let 퐴 and 퐵 be two 퐶푃푃 instances that diﬀer in a single agent 퐼 with utility function 푓퐼 . We show
that the output set of resources, even revealing the order in which the resources were chosen, is privacy
preserving. Fix some ordered set of 푘 resources, 휋1, . . . , 휋푘 write 푆푖 =
∪푖−1
푗=1{휋(푗)} to denote the ﬁrst 푖 − 1
elements, and write 푠푖,푗(퐴) = 퐹퐴(푆푖 + {푗}) − 퐹퐴(푆푖) to denote the marginal utility of item 푗 at time 푖 in
instance 퐴. Deﬁne 푠푖,푗(퐵) similarly for instance 퐵. We consider the relative probability of our mechanism
outputting ordering 휋 when given inputs 퐴 and 퐵:
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
=
푘∏
푖=1
(
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,휋푖(퐴))/(
∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴)))
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,휋푖(퐵))/(
∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐵)))
)
,
where the sum over 푗 is over all remaining unselected resources. We can separate this into two products
푘∏
푖=1
(
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,휋푖(퐴))
exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,휋푖(퐵))
)
⋅
푘∏
푖=1
(∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐵))∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴))
)
.
If퐴 contains agent 퐼 but퐵 does not, the second product is at most 1, and the ﬁrst is at most exp(휖′
∑푘
푖=1(퐹퐼(푆푖)−
퐹퐼(푆푖−1))) ≤ exp(휖′). If 퐵 contains agent 퐼, and 퐴 does not, the ﬁrst product is at most 1, and in the re-
mainder of the proof, we focus on this case. We will write 훽푖,푗 = 푠푖,푗(퐵) − 푠푖,푗(퐴) to be the additional
marginal utility of item 푗 at time 푖 in instance 퐵 over instance 퐴, due to agent 퐼. Thus
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
≤
푘∏
푖=1
(∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐵))∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴))
)
=
푘∏
푖=1
(∑
푗 exp(휖
′훽푖,푗) ⋅ exp(휖′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴))∑
푗 exp(휖
′ ⋅ 푠푖,푗(퐴))
)
=
푘∏
푖=1
피푖[exp(휖′훽푖)],
where 훽푖 is the marginal utility actually achieved at time 푖 by agent 퐼, and the expectation is taken over the
probability distribution over resources selected at time 푖 in instance 퐴. For all 푥 ≤ 1, 푒푥 ≤ 1 + (푒 − 1) ⋅ 푥.
Therefore, for all 휖′ ≤ 1, we have:
푘∏
푖=1
피푖[exp(휖′훽푖)] ≤
푘∏
푖=1
퐸푖[1 + (푒− 1)휖′훽푖]
≤ exp((푒− 1)휖′
푘∑
푖=1
퐸푖[훽푖]).
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As in the set-cover proof, we split the set of possible outputs into two sets. We call an output sequence
푞-good for an agent 퐼 in instance 퐴 if this sum
∑푘
푖=1퐸푖[훽푖] is bounded above by 푞, and call it 푞-bad otherwise.
For a (ln(푒훿−1))-good output 휋, we can then write
Pr[푀(퐴) = 휋]
Pr[푀(퐵) = 휋]
≤ exp((푒− 1)휖′ ⋅ ln(푒훿−1).
Moreover, note that since the total realized utility of any agent is at most 1, if agent 퐼 has realized utility
푢푖−1 before the 푖th set is chosen, then 훽푖 is distributed in [0, 1−푢푖−1]. Moreover, 푢푖 = 푢푖−1 +훽푖. Lemma B.2
then implies that the probability that the algorithms outputs a (ln(푒훿−1))-bad permutation is at most 훿.
The theorem follows.
Remark 1. By choosing 휖′ = 휖/푘, we immediately get 휖-diﬀerential privacy and expected utility at least
(1− 1/푒)OPT−푂(푘2 ln푚/휖). This may give better guarantees for some values of 푘 and 훿.
We remark that the 푘-coverage problem is a special case of the CPP problem. Therefore:
Corollary 8.4. The CPP algorithm (with sets as resources) is an (휖, 훿)-diﬀerential privacy preserving algo-
rithm for the 푘-coverage problem achieving approximation factor at least (1−1/푒)OPT−푂(푘 log푚 log(2/훿)/휖).
8.3 Truthfulness
The CPP problem can be viewed as a mechanism design problem when each agent 푖 has a choice of whether
to submit his actual valuation function 푓푖, or to lie and submit a diﬀerent valuation function 푓
′
푖 if such a
misrepresentation yields a better outcome for agent 푖. A mechanism is truthful if for every valuation function
of agents 푗 ∕= 푖, and every valuation function 푓푖 of agent 푖, there is never a function 푓 ′푖 ∕= 푓푖 such that agent
푖 can beneﬁt by misrepresenting his valuation function as 푓 ′푖 . Intuitively, a mechanism is approximately
truthful if no agent can make more than a slight gain by not truthfully reporting.
Deﬁnition 3. A mechanism for the CPP problem is 훾-truthful if for every agent 푖, for every set of player
valuations 푓푗 for 푗 ∕= 푖, and for every valuation function 푓 ′푖 ∕= 푓푖:
퐸[푓푖(푀(푓1, . . . , 푓푖, . . . , 푓푛))] ≥ 퐸[푓푖(푀(푓1, . . . , 푓 ′푖 , . . . , 푓푛))]− 훾
Note that 0-truthfulness corresponds to the usual notion of (exact) truthfulness.
(휖, 훿)-diﬀerential privacy in our setting immediately implies (2휖+ 훿)-approximate truthfulness. We note
that Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] showed that the CPP problem is inapproximable to an 푚
1
2−휖 multiplicative
factor by any polynomial time 0-truthful mechanism. Our result shows that relaxing that to 훾-truthfulness
allows us to give a constant approximation to the utility whenever OPT ≥ 2푘 log푚 log(1/훾)/훾 for any 훾.
8.4 Lower Bounds
Theorem 8.5. No 휖-diﬀerentially private algorithm for the maximum coverage problem can guarantee proﬁt
larger than OPT− (푘 log(푚/푘)/20휖).
The proof is almost identical to that of the lower bound Theorem 4.5 for 푘-median, and hence is omitted.
9 Steiner Forest
Consider the Steiner network problem, where we are given a metric space 푀 = (푉, 푑) on 푛 points, and
a (private) subset 푅 ⊆ 푉 × 푉 of source-sink (terminal) pairs. The goal is to buy a minimum-cost set of
edges 퐸(푅) ⊂ (푉2) such that these edges connect up each terminal pair in 푅. As in previous cases, we give
instructions in the form of a tree 푇 = (푉,퐸푇 ); each terminal pair (푢, 푣) ∈ 푅 takes the unique path 푃푇 (푢, 푣)
in this tree 푇 between themselves, and the (implicit) solution is the set of edges 퐸(푅) =
∪
(푢,푣)∈푅 푃푇 (푢, 푣).
The tree 푇 is given by the randomized construction of Fakcharoenphol et al. [FRT04], which guarantees
that 피[cost(퐸(푅))] ≤ 푂(log 푛) ⋅OPT; moreover, since the construction is oblivious to the set 푅, it preserves
the privacy of the terminal pairs perfectly (i.e., 휖 = 0). The same idea can be used for a variety of network
design problem (such as the “buy-at-bulk” problem) which can be solved by reducing it to a tree instance.
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10 Private Ampliﬁcation Theorem
In this section, we show that diﬀerentially private mechanisms that give good guarantees in expectation can
be repeated privately to amplify the probability of a good outcome. First note that if we simply repeat a
private algorithm 푇 times, and select the best outcome, we can get the following result:
Theorem 10.1. Let 푀 : 퐷 → 푅 be an 휖-diﬀerentially private mechanism such that for a query function 푞,
and a parameter 푄, Pr[푞(퐴,푀(퐴)) ≥ 푄] ≥ 12 . Then for any 훿 > 0, 휖′ ∈ (0, 12 ), there is a mechanism 푀 ′
which satisﬁes the following properties:
∙ Utility: Pr[푞(퐴,푀(퐴)) ≥ 푄] ≥ (1− 2−푇 ).
∙ Eﬃciency: 푀 ′ makes 푇 calls to 푀 .
∙ Privacy: 푀 ′ satisﬁes (휖푇 )-diﬀerential privacy.
Note that the privacy parameter degrades linearly with 푇 . Thus to bring down the failure probability to
inverse polynomial, one will have to make 푇 logarithmic. To get 휖′-diﬀerential privacy, one would then take
휖 to be 휖′/푇 . If 푄 was inversely proportional to 휖, as is the case in many of our algorithms, this leads to an
additional logarithmic loss. The next theorem shows a more sophisticated ampliﬁcation technique that does
better.
Theorem 10.2 (Private Ampliﬁcation Theorem). Let 푀 : 퐷 → 푅 be an 휖-diﬀerentially private mechanism
such that for a query function 푞 with sensitivity 1, and a parameter 푄, Pr[푞(퐴,푀(퐴)) ≥ 푄] ≥ 푝 for some
푝 ∈ (0, 1). Then for any 훿 > 0, 휖′ ∈ (0, 12 ), there is a mechanism 푀 ′ which satisﬁes the following properties:∙ Pr[푞(퐴,푀(퐴)) ≥ 푄− 4휖′ log( 1휖′훿푝 )] ≥ (1− 훿).
∙ 푀 ′ makes 푂(( 1휖′훿푝 )2 log( 1휖′훿푝 )) calls to 푀 .
∙ 푀 ′ satisﬁes (휖+ 8휖′)-diﬀerential privacy.
Proof. Let 푇 = ( 8휖′훿푝 )
2 log( 1휖′훿푝 ). The mechanism 푀
′ runs 푀 on the input 퐴 independently (푇 + 1) times
to get outputs 푆1 = {푟1, . . . , 푟푇+1}. It also adds in 푇 ′ =
√
4푇 log 푇
휖′ dummy outcomes 푆2 = {푠1, . . . , 푠푇 ′}
and selects an outcome from 푆1 ∪ 푆2 using the exponential mechanism with privacy parameter 휀′ and score
function
푞˜(퐴, 푟) =
{
min(푄, 푞(퐴, 푟)) if 푟 ∈ 푆1
푄 if 푟 ∈ 푆2
The eﬃciency of 푀 ′ is immediate from the construction. To analyze the utility, note that (2.4) ensures
that the exponential mechanism’s output 푟 satisﬁes 푞˜(퐴, 푟) > 푄 − 4휖′ log( 1휖′훿푝 ) with probability (1 − 훿2 ).
Conditioned on the output 푟 satisfying this property, the ratio Pr[푟 ∈ 푆1]/Pr[푟 ∈ 푆2] is at least ∣{푟 ∈ 푆1 :
푞(퐴, 푟) ≥ 푄}∣/∣푆2∣. Since the numerator is at least 푝푇 in expectation, the probability of 푟 being a dummy
outcome is at most 훿2 . This establishes the utility property.
We now show the privacy property. For any 푟0 ∈ 푅,
Pr[푀 ′(퐴) = 푟0] =
푇+1∑
푖=1
Pr[푟푖 = 푟0]피
[
exp(휖′푞˜(퐴, 푟0))∑
푟∈푆1 exp(휖
′푞˜(퐴, 푟)) + 푇 ′ exp(휖′푄)
∣∣∣∣ 푟푖 = 푟0
]
= (푇 + 1) ⋅Pr[푀(퐴) outputs 푟0] ⋅ exp(휖′푞˜(퐴, 푟0)) ⋅ 피
[
1∑
푟∈푆1 exp(휖
′푞˜(퐴, 푟)) + 푇 ′ exp(휖′푄)
∣∣∣∣ 푟푇+1 = 푟0
]
= (푇 + 1) ⋅Pr[푀(퐴) outputs 푟0] ⋅ exp(휖′푞˜(퐴, 푟0)) ⋅ exp(−휖′푄)⋅
피
[
1∑
푟∈푆1∖{푟0} exp(휖
′(푞˜(퐴, 푟)−푄)) + exp(휖′(푞˜(퐴, 푟0)−푄)) + 푇 ′
]
(10.9)
where the expectation is also taken over runs 1, . . . , 푇 of 푀 (we’ve explicitly conditioned on run (푇 + 1)
producing 푟0).
It is easy to bound the change in the ﬁrst two terms when we change from input 퐴 to a neighboring input
퐵, since 푀 satisﬁes 휖-diﬀerential privacy, and 푞˜ has sensitivity 1. Let 퐷 = 퐷(퐴) denote the denominator in
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the ﬁnal expectation; we would like to show that 피[ 1퐷(퐴) ] ≤ exp(휖)피[ 1퐷(퐵) ] for neighboring inputs 퐴 and 퐵.
Let 퐶 = exp(휖′(푞˜(퐴, 푟0)−푄)) + 푇 ′ denote the constant term in 퐷(퐴).
First observe that
피[퐷(퐴)] = 퐶 + 푇 ⋅ 피푟∈푀(퐴)[exp(휖′(푞˜(퐴, 푟)−푄)]
≥ 퐶 + 푇 ⋅ exp(−휖′) ⋅ 피푟∈푀(퐴)[exp(휖′(푞˜(퐵, 푟)−푄)]
≥ 퐶 + 푇 ⋅ exp(−2휖′) ⋅ 피푟∈푀(퐵)[exp(휖′(푞˜(퐵, 푟)−푄)]
≥ exp(−2휖′) ⋅ 피[퐷(퐵)],
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the sensitivity of 푞 and the second from the 휖-diﬀerential privacy of
푀 . Thus 피[퐷(퐴)] is close to 피[퐷(퐵)]. We now show that 피[ 1퐷(퐴) ] is close to
1
피[퐷(퐴)] for each 퐴, which will
complete the proof.
The ﬁrst step is to establish that 퐷(퐴) is concentrated around its expectation. Since 퐷 = 퐶 +
∑푇
푖=1 푌푖,
where the 푌푖’s are i.i.d. random variables in [0, 1], standard concentration bounds imply
Pr[퐷 ≥ 피[퐷] + 푡] ≤ exp(−2푡2/푇 ); Pr[퐷 ≤ 피[퐷]− 푡] ≤ exp(−2푡2/푇 );
Since 1퐷 ≥ 1퐶 , we can now estimate
피[
1
퐷
] ≤ exp(휖
′)
피[퐷]
+
∫ 1
퐶
exp(휖′)
피[퐷]
Pr[
1
퐷
≥ 푦]d푦
≤ exp(휖
′)
피[퐷]
+
∫ exp(−휖′)피[퐷]
퐶
Pr[퐷 ≤ 푧]
푧2
d푧
≤ exp(휖
′)
피[퐷]
+
1
퐶2
∫ exp(−휖′)피[퐷]
퐶
exp(−2(푧 − 피[퐷])2/푇 )d푧
≤ exp(휖
′)
피[퐷]
+
(exp(−휖′)피[퐷]− 퐶)
퐶2
exp(−(휖′피[퐷])2/푇 )
≤ exp(휖
′)
피[퐷]
+
1
푇 2
since 피[퐷] > 퐶 >
√
4푇 log 푇
휖′ , 피[퐷] < 2푇 , and 퐶 > 1. Thus 피[
1
퐷 ] ≤ exp(2휀
′)
피[퐷] .
Similarly,
피[
1
퐷
] ≥ exp(−휖
′)
피[퐷]
−
∫ exp(−휖′)
피[퐷]
0
Pr[
1
퐷
≤ 푦]d푦
≥ exp(−휖
′)
피[퐷]
−
∫ ∞
exp(휖′)피[퐷]
Pr[퐷 ≥ 푧]
푧2
d푧
≥ exp(−휖
′)
피[퐷]
− exp(−2휖
′)
피[퐷]2
∫ ∞
exp(휖′)피[퐷]
exp(−2(푧 − 피[퐷])2/푇 )d푧
≥ exp(−휖
′)
피[퐷]
− exp(−2휖
′)
피[퐷]2
√
푇
≥ exp(−휖
′)
피[퐷]
− 휖
′
피[퐷]
,
so that 피[ 1퐷 ] ≥ exp(−3휖
′)
피[퐷] .
Thus 피[ 1퐷(퐴) ] ≤ exp(7휖′)피[ 1퐷(퐵) ] for neighboring inputs 퐴 and 퐵. Now using this fact in expression (10.9)
for Pr[푀 ′(퐴) = 푟0] above, we conclude that 푀 ′ satisﬁes (휖+ 8휖′)-diﬀerential privacy.
26
References
[AGK+04] Vijay Arya, Naveen Garg, Rohit Khandekar, Adam Meyerson, Kamesh Munagala, and Vinayaka
Pandit. Local search heuristics for 푘-median and facility location problems. SIAM J. Comput.,
33(3):544–562, 2004.
[BCNW06] A. Beimel, P. Carmi, K. Nissim, and E. Weinreb. Private approximation of search problems. In
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 119–128.
ACM New York, NY, USA, 2006.
[BHN07] A. Beimel, R. Hallak, and K. Nissim. Private Approximation of Clustering and Vertex Cover.
Theory of Cryptography Conference, 4392:383, 2007.
[BLR08] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth. A learning theory approach to non-interactive database
privacy. In Proceedings of the fourtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages
609–618. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2008.
[BMNW07] A. Beimel, T. Malkin, K. Nissim, and E. Weinreb. How Should We Solve Search Problems
Privately? In CRYPTO, volume 4622, page 31. Springer, 2007.
[BNO08] Amos Beimel, Kobbi Nissim, and Eran Omri. Distributed private data analysis: Simultaneously
solving how and what. In David Wagner, editor, CRYPTO, volume 5157 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 451–468. Springer, 2008.
[Chv79] V. Chva´tal. A greedy heuristic for the set-covering problem. Mathematics of operations research,
pages 233–235, 1979.
[DKM+06] Cynthia Dwork, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Frank McSherry, Ilya Mironov, and Moni Naor.
Our data, ourselves: privacy via distributed noise generation. In Advances in cryptology—
EUROCRYPT 2006, volume 4004 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 486–503. Springer,
Berlin, 2006.
[DMNS06] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private
data analysis. Proceedings of the 3rd Theory of Cryptography Conference, pages 265–284, 2006.
[DNR+09] C. Dwork, M. Naor, O. Reingold, G.N. Rothblum, and S. Vadhan. On the complexity of
diﬀerentially private data release: eﬃcient algorithms and hardness results. In Proceedings of
the 41st annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing, pages 381–390. ACM
New York, NY, USA, 2009.
[Dwo06] Cynthia Dwork. Diﬀerential privacy. In Automata, languages and programming. Part II, volume
4052 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 1–12. Springer, Berlin, 2006.
[Dwo08] C. Dwork. Diﬀerential Privacy: A Survey of Results. In Theory and Applications of Models
of Computation–TAMC 2008, volume 4978 of Lecture Notes In Computer Science, pages 1–19,
2008.
[FF56] L.R. Ford and D.R. Fulkerson. Maximal ﬂow through a network. Canadian Journal of Mathe-
matics, 8(3):399–404, 1956.
[FFKN09] D. Feldman, A. Fiat, H. Kaplan, and K. Nissim. Private coresets. In Proceedings of the 41st
annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing, pages 361–370. ACM New York,
NY, USA, 2009.
[FIM+06] Joan Feigenbaum, Yuval Ishai, Tal Malkin, Kobbi Nissim, Martin J. Strauss, and Rebecca N.
Wright. Secure multiparty computation of approximations. ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2(3):435–
472, 2006.
27
[FRT04] Jittat Fakcharoenphol, Satish Rao, and Kunal Talwar. A tight bound on approximating arbitrary
metrics by tree metrics. J. Comput. System Sci., 69(3):485–497, 2004.
[HKKN01] S. Halevi, R. Krauthgamer, E. Kushilevitz, and K. Nissim. Private approximation of NP-hard
functions. In Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing,
pages 550–559. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2001.
[Hoc82] D.S. Hochbaum. Approximation algorithms for the set covering and vertex cover problems.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 11:555, 1982.
[Ind04] P. Indyk. Algorithms for dynamic geometric problems over data streams. In Proceedings of the
thirty-sixth annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 373–380. ACM New York,
NY, USA, 2004.
[IW06] P. Indyk and D. Woodruﬀ. Polylogarithmic Private Approximations and Eﬃcient Matching.
Theory of Cryptography, 3876:245, 2006.
[Joh74] D.S. Johnson. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial problems. J. Comput. Syst. Sci.,
9:256–278, 1974.
[Kar93] David R. Karger. Global min-cuts in RNC, and other ramiﬁcations of a simple min-cut algo-
rithm. In Proceedings of the Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
(Austin, TX, 1993), pages 21–30, New York, 1993. ACM.
[KLN+08] Shiva Kasiviswanathan, Homin K. Lee, Kobbi Nissim, Sofya Raskhodnikova, and Adam Smith.
What can we learn privately? In Proceedings of the 49th annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, 2008.
[MKA+08] Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, John M. Abowd, Johannes Gehrke, and Lars Vilhuber.
Privacy: Theory meets practice on the map. In ICDE, pages 277–286. IEEE, 2008.
[MT07] F. McSherry and K. Talwar. Mechanism Design via Diﬀerential Privacy. In Proceedings of the
48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 94–103, 2007.
[NRS07] Kobbi Nissim, Sofya Raskhodnikova, and Adam Smith. Smooth sensitivity and sampling in
private data analysis. In STOC’07—Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing, pages 75–84. ACM, New York, 2007.
[NWF78] GL Nemhauser, LA Wolsey, and ML Fisher. An analysis of approximations for maximizing
submodular set functionsI. Mathematical Programming, 14(1):265–294, 1978.
[Pit85] L. Pitt. A simple probabilistic approximation algorithm for vertex cover. Technical report, Yale
University, 1985.
[PSS08] C. Papadimitriou, M. Schapira, and Y. Singer. On the Hardness of Being Truthful. In Proceedings
of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2008.
A Unweighted Vertex Cover Algorithm: An Alternate View
In this section, we consider a slightly diﬀerent way to implement the vertex cover algorithm. Given a
graph 퐺 = (푉,퐸), we mimic the randomized proportional-to-degree algorithm for 훼푛 rounds (훼 < 1), and
output the remaining vertices in random order. That is, in each of the ﬁrst 훼푛 rounds, we select the next
vertex 푖 with probability proportional to 푑(푖) + 1/휖: this is equivalent to imagining that each vertex has 1/휖
“hallucinated” edges in addition to its real edges. (It is most convenient to imagine the other endpoint of
these hallucinated edges as being fake vertices which are always ignored by the algorithm.)
When we select a vertex, we remove it from the graph, together with the real and hallucinated edges
adjacent to it. This is equivalent to picking a random (real or hallucinated) edge from the graph, and
outputting a random real endpoint. Outputting a vertex aﬀects the real edges in the remaining graph, but
does not change the hallucinated edges incident to other vertices.
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Privacy Analysis. The privacy analysis is similar to that of Theorem 5.1: imagine the weights being
푤푖 = 1/휖 for the ﬁrst 훼푛 rounds and 푤푖 = ∞ for the remaining rounds, which gives us 2
∑푛
푖=(1−훼)푛
1
푖푤푖
≤
휖 ( 2훼1−훼 )-diﬀerential privacy.
Utility Analysis. To analyze the utility, we couple our algorithm with a run of the non-private algorithm
풜 that at each step picks an arbitrary edge of the graph and then picks a random endpoint: it is an easy
exercise that this an 2-approximation algorithm.
We refer to vertices that have non-zero “real” degree at the time they are selected by our algorithm as
interesting vertices: the cost of our algorithm is simply the number of interesting vertices it selects in the
course of its run. Let 퐼1 denote the number of interesting vertices it selects during the ﬁrst 훼푛 steps, and
퐼2 denote the number of interesting vertices it selects during its remaining (1− 훼)푛 steps, when it is simply
ordering vertices randomly. Clearly, the total cost is 퐼1 + 퐼2.
We may view the ﬁrst phase of our algorithm as selecting an edge at random (from among both real and
hallucinated ones) and then outputting one of its endpoints at random. Now, for the rounds in which our
algorithm selects a real edge, we can couple this selection with one step of an imagined run of 풜 (selecting
the same edge and endpoint). Note that this run of 풜 maintains a vertex cover that is a subset of our vertex
cover, and that once our algorithm has completed a vertex cover, no interesting vertices remain. Therefore,
while our algorithm continues to incur cost, 풜 has not yet found a vertex cover.
In the ﬁrst phase of our algorithm, every interesting vertex our algorithm selects has at least one real
edge adjacent to it, as well as 1/휖 hallucinated edges. Conditioned on selecting an interesting vertex, our
algorithm had selected a real edge with probability at least 휖′ = 1/(1 + 1/휖). Let 푅 denote the random
variable that represents the number of steps 풜 is run for. 퐸[푅] ≤ 2OPT since 풜 is a 2-approximation
algorithm. By linearity of expectation:
2OPT ≥ 피[푅] ≥ 휖′ ⋅ 퐸[퐼1] (A.10)
We now show that most of our algorithm’s cost comes from the ﬁrst phase, and hence that 퐼2 is not much
larger than 퐼1.
Lemma A.1.
피[퐼1] ≥ ln
(
1
1− 훼
)
⋅ 피[퐼2]
Proof. Consider each of the 훼푛 steps of the ﬁrst phase of our algorithm. Let 푛푖 denote the number of
interesting vertices remaining at step 푖. Note that {푛푖} is a non-increasing sequence. At step 푖, there are
푛푖 interesting vertices and 푛 − 푖 + 1 remaining vertices. Note that the probability of picking an interesting
vertex is strictly greater than 푛푖/(푛− 푖+ 1) at each step. We may therefore bound the expected number of
interesting vertices picked in the ﬁrst phase:
피[퐼1] >
훼푛∑
푖=1
피[푛푖]
푛− 푖+ 1 ≥ 피[푛훼푛]
푛∑
푗=(1−훼)푛
1
푗
≥ ln
(
1
1− 훼
)
⋅ 피[푛훼푛]
Noting that 피[퐼2] ≤ 피[푛훼푛] completes the proof.
Combining the facts above, we get that
피[cost]
OPT
≤ 2
휖′
(
1 +
1
ln(1− 훼)−1
)
. (A.11)
B Missing Proofs
In this section, we prove Lemma 6.4. The lemma is a consequence of the following more general inequality.
Consider the following 푛 round probabilistic process. In each round, an adversary chooses a 푝푖 ∈ [0, 1]
possibly based on the ﬁrst (푖 − 1) rounds and a coin is tossed with heads probability 푝푖. Let 푍푖 be the
indicator for the the event that no coin comes up heads in the ﬁrst 푖 steps. Let 푌푗 denote the random
variable
∑푛
푖=푗 푝푖푍푖 and let 푌 = 푌1.
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Lemma B.1. Let 푌 be deﬁned as above. Then for any 푞, Pr[푌 > 푞] ≤ exp(−푞).
Proof. We claim that for any 푗 and any 푞, Pr[푌푗 > 푞] ≤ exp(−푞), which implies the lemma. The proof
is by reverse induction on 푗. For 푗 = 푛, 푌푛 is 0 if the 푛th coin or any coin before it comes up heads and
푝푛 otherwise. Thus for 푞 ≥ 푝푛, the left hand side is zero. For 푞 ∈ [0, 푝푛), the left hand side is at most
(1− 푝푛) ≤ exp(−푝푛) ≤ exp(−푞). Finally, for 푞 < 0 the right hand side exceeds 1.
Now suppose that for any adversary’s strategy and for all 푞, Pr[푌푗+1 > 푞] ≤ exp(−푞). We will show
the claim for 푌푗 . Once again, for 푞 ≤ 0, the claim is trivial. In round 푗, if the adversary chooses 푝푗 ,
there is a probability 푝푗 that the coin comes up heads so that 푌푗 = 0. Thus for any 푞 ≥ 0, Pr[푌푗 > 푞] =
Pr[푝푗푍푗 + 푌푗+1 > 푞] = (1− 푝푗)Pr[푌푗+1 > 푞− 푝푗 ]. Using the inequality (1− 푥) ≤ exp(−푥) and the inductive
hypothesis, the claim follows for 푌푗 .
To map the randomized algorithm to the setting of lemma B.1, we consider running the randomized
weighted set cover algorithm as follows. When choosing a set 푆 in step 푖, the algorithm ﬁrst tosses a
coin whose heads probability is 푝푖(퐴) to decide whether to pick a set covering 퐼 or not. Then it uses a
second source of randomness to determine the set 푆 itself, sampling from {푆 : 퐼 ∈ 푆} or {푆 : 퐼 ∕∈ 푆} with the
appropriate conditional probabilities based on the outcome of the coin. Clearly this is a valid implementation
of the weighted set cover algorithm. Note that the probabilities 푝푖(퐴) may depend on the actual sets chosen
in the ﬁrst (푖− 1) steps if none of the ﬁrst (푖− 1) coins come up heads. Since lemma B.1 applies even when
푝푖(퐴)’s are chosen adversarially, lemma 6.4 follows.
We also prove a more general version of Lemma B.1 that applies to non-Bernoulli distributions. This
lemma will be needed to prove the privacy of our algorithm for submodular minimization in Section 8. We
now consider a diﬀerent 푛 round probabilistic process. In each round, an adversary chooses a distribution
풟푖 over [0, 1], possibly based on the ﬁrst (푖− 1) rounds and a sample 푅푖 is drawn from the distribution 풟푖.
Let 푍0 = 1 and let 푍푖+1 = 푍푖 − 푅푖푍푖. Let 푌푗 denote the random variable
∑푛
푗=1 푍푖퐸[푅푖] and let 푌 denote
푌1.
Lemma B.2. Let 푌 be deﬁned as above. Then for any 푞, Pr[푌 > 푞] ≤ 푒 exp(−푞).
Proof. We prove a stronger claim. We show that for Pr[푌푗 ≥ 푞푍푗 ] ≤ 푒 exp(−푞). The proof is by reverse
induction on 푗. For 푗 = 푛, 푌푛 = 퐸[푅푛]푍푛 ≤ 푍푛 since 풟푛 is supported on [0, 1] and hence has expectation
at most 1. Thus the claim is trivial for any 푞 ≥ 1. For 푞 ≤ 1, the right hand side is at least 1 and there is
nothing to prove. Supppose that for any 푞 and any strategy of the adversary, Pr[푌푗+1 ≥ 푞푍푗+1] ≤ 푒 exp(−푞).
We show the claim for 푌푗 . Once again the case 푞 ≤ 1 is trivial, so we assume 푞 ≥ 1. Let 휇푗 denote 퐸[푅푗 ].
Note that 푌푗 = 푍푗휇푗 + 푌푗+1. Moreover, 푍푗+1 = (1−푅푗)푍푗 . Thus,
Pr[푌푗 ≥ 푞푍푗 ] = 퐸푅푗∈풟푗 [Pr[푌푗+1 ≥ 푞푍푗−휇푗푍푗 ]] = 퐸푅푗∈풟푗 [Pr[푌푗+1 ≥
푞 − 휇푗
1−푅푗 푍푗+1]] ≤ 퐸푅푗∈풟푗 [푒 exp(−
푞 − 휇푗
1−푅푗 )].
We show that for any distribution 풟, the last term is bounded by 푒 exp(−푞), which will complete the proof.
Re-arranging, it suﬃces to show that for any distribution 풟 on [0, 1],
퐸푅∈풟[exp(
휇− 푞푅
1−푅 )] ≤ 1.
Since 휇−푞푅1−푅 is positive when 푅 ≤ 휇/푞 and negative otherwise, one can verify that for any 푅, exp(휇−푞푅1−푅 ) ≤
exp(휇−푞푅1−휇푞 ). Moreover, since exp(⋅) is convex, the function lies below the chord and we can conclude that
exp(휇−푞푅1−휇푞 ) ≤ exp(
휇
1−휇푞 ) +푅(exp(
휇−푞
1−휇푞 )− exp(
휇
1−휇푞 )). Thus it suﬃces to prove that
exp(
휇
1− 휇푞
) + 휇(exp(
휇− 푞
1− 휇푞
)− exp( 휇
1− 휇푞
)) ≤ 1,
or equivalently
1 + 휇(exp(
−푞
1− 휇푞
)− 1 ≤ exp( −휇
1− 휇푞
).
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This rearranges to
1− exp(− 휇
1− 휇푞
) ≤ 휇(1− exp(− 푞
1− 휇푞
)).
Consider the function 푓(푥) = 1−exp(− 푥1−휇푞 ). 푓 is convex with 푓(0) = 0 and 푓(1) ≤ 푓(푞) = (1−exp(−
푞
1−휇푞 )).
Thus 푓(휇) ≤ 휇푓(1) ≤ 휇푓(푞), for 푞 ≥ 1. The claim follows.
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